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NORTH CAROLINA CHARTER SCHOOLS’ 
(NON-?) COMPLIANCE WITH STATE AND 
FEDERAL NONPROFIT LAW* 
THOMAS A. KELLEY III** 
In North Carolina, as in most jurisdictions across the 
country, state law requires that charter schools be governed 
by nonprofit corporations. This Article examines the 
governance practices of a select group of North Carolina 
charter-holding nonprofits and asks whether they are 
complying with state and federal nonprofit law. It 
scrutinizes with particular care a group of North Carolina 
charter-holding nonprofit corporations that have entered 
into comprehensive management agreements with for-profit 
educational management organizations, also known as 
EMOs. Based on an exhaustive analysis of the nonprofit 
corporations’ board meeting minutes, contracts, financial 
reports, tax filings, and real estate records, this Article 
concludes that certain North Carolina charter-holding 
nonprofits have very likely violated nonprofit law by in 
essence handing the keys of the charter schools over to the 
for-profit EMOs, permitting them with minimal supervision 
or disclosure to convert public educational dollars into 
significant corporate profits. This Article calls for legal and 
regulatory reform to rein in abusive practices by for-profit 
EMOs and more effectively safeguard the public funds that 
North Carolina citizens have devoted to education. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A. Charter School Fault Lines 
Depending on whom you ask, charter schools are either saving or 
destroying public education in North Carolina and across the United 
States. If you believe proponents, charter schools are engines of 
educational innovation.1 They are unhindered by state government’s 
education-related bureaucratic strictures,2 so they have more 
flexibility to hire qualified teachers (and fire those who 
underperform) and experiment with pedagogical approaches.3 As 
they innovate, charters produce new ideas and new methods that can 
be adopted by traditional public schools.4 Crucially, charters provide 
enhanced school choice for North Carolina parents, which, according 
to proponents, is an unalloyed benefit.5 
According to detractors, charter schools divert desperately 
needed resources from already underfunded traditional public 
 
 1. See, e.g., The Facts on Charter Schools, PUB. SCH. FIRST NC, http://
www.publicschoolsfirstnc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/12-15-14-The-Facts-on-Charter-
Schools.pdf (last modified Dec. 15, 2014) [hereinafter The Facts on Charter Schools]. 
 2. See id. (stating that North Carolina charter schools are exempt from most 
regulations and statutes that apply to other public schools). 
 3. See Paul T. Hill, Realizing Chartering’s Full Potential, in CHARTER SCHOOLS 
AGAINST THE ODDS 179, 187 (Paul T. Hill ed., 2006) (advocating for fewer barriers to 
charter schools’ ability to “make innovative use of artists, scientists, mathematicians, and 
other masters of key subject matter”); Molly O’Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and 
the “Deregulated” Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 137, 154–55 (2000) (“Charter school 
reform advocates assert that charter schools, . . . freed from the reform-stifling politics of 
bureaucratic school districts and entrenched teacher organizations, will be better and more 
responsive schools. Deregulation is expected to produce flexibility and innovation.”). 
 4. See O’Brien, supra note 3, at 139 (“Many charter school laws explicitly exempt 
charter schools from most state laws and local regulations so that they are free to innovate, 
to become laboratories for school reform. The charter school is envisioned as an engine 
for system-wide reform and innovation.”); Pedro Noguera, Why Don’t We Have Real 
Data on Charter Schools?, THE NATION (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.thenation.com
/article/181753/why-dont-we-have-real-data-charter-schools# (arguing that early charter 
school proponents believed charter schools would “serve as a laboratory for innovations 
that would then be applied to public schools”). 
 5. The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1; see also Derek W. Black, Charter 
Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445, 449 (2013) 
(“[S]ome argue that the greatest public good occurs when everyone is pursuing individual 
good because maximizing individual good accrues to the benefit of the whole. Per this 
concept, the individual good does not sacrifice the public good but actually serves it.”). 
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schools.6 Because, unlike traditional public schools, they are not 
required to pay for students’ transportation to and from school, 
because they are not required to feed students once they are on 
campus, and because they are not required to accommodate children 
with special needs,7 they tend to attract those from motivated, often 
higher-resourced families, leaving traditional public schools to 
grapple with the more challenging and expensive students.8 Critics 
add that studies demonstrate that in spite of charters’ operational 
flexibility, they perform no better than traditional public schools at 
the essential task of educating children.9 Finally, opponents argue that 
 
 6. The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1 (arguing that charters divert 
resources from traditional public schools); see also Black, supra note 5, at 469–75 (arguing 
a significant portion of traditional public schools have been underfunded for some time 
and that the rise of charter schools exacerbates that resource problem). 
 7. Lisa Lukasik, Deconstructing a Decade of Charter School Funding: An Argument 
for Reform, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1885, 1889 (2012); see also Letter from the N.C. Justice Ctr. 
to the N.C. State Bd. of Educ. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default
/files/M_Ellinwood%20Charter%20Applicant%20Letter%208_30_12.pdf (discussing lack 
of transportation provided by charter schools as well as difficulties in serving children with 
special needs); The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1 (discussing concerns that 
charter schools will fail to meet students’ educational needs). 
 8. See Lukasik, supra note 7, at 1889 (referring to the fear that North Carolina 
charter schools create a “two track system”); see also Jeffrey R. Henig, Charter Inroads in 
Affluent Communities: Hype or Turning Point?, in HOPES, FEARS, AND REALITIES: A 
BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 2012, at 13 (Robin J. Lake 
ed., 2013) (maintaining that even charter schools serving nonaffluent minority 
communities had lower proportions of special education, non-English-speaking, and truly 
poor students and tended to “crop off” students who cost more to educate); Black, supra 
note 5, at 474 (arguing that studies clearly show that charter schools engage in “cropping,” 
or discouraging the enrollment of high-need students, which results in a higher burden for 
the nearby traditional public schools); Lisa Rab, Getting Schooled: Charter Schools Are a 
Booming Business, and North Carolina Has Opened the Floodgates, CHARLOTTE 
MAG. (Oct. 2012), http://www.charlottemagazine.com/Charlotte-Magazine/October-
2012/Getting-Schooled/ (noting that critics accuse charter schools of catering to wealthier, 
white children, excluding needier kids and referring to a 2007 University of Michigan 
study that concluded that high achievement scores among students in a group of charter 
schools merely reflected the fact that the students were of high socioeconomic status). But 
see Robin J. Lake, Will the Charter Movement Rest on Its Laurels or Innovate and Expand, 
in HOPES, FEARS, AND REALITIES: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER 
SCHOOLS IN 2012, at 2 (arguing that concerns about charters focusing on white suburbs 
are unfounded because it is a sign that charter schools are becoming widely accepted by a 
broad cross section of the public); Noguera, supra note 4 (arguing that many charter 
schools accept only the least difficult and therefore least expensive students). 
 9. Lukasik, supra note 7, at 1889 (citing CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, 
STANFORD UNIV., MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES, at 
6 (2009), http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf); see 
also Natalie Gomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform: Governance, Accountability, 
Outsourcing, 45 URB. LAW. 51, 91 (2013) (arguing that “current ‘business model’ reform 
efforts that rely on outsourcing and the use of high stakes tests for everything from student 
retention to teacher evaluation to school closure have failed to establish improvements in 
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the seamy underside of school choice is that charters are leading to 
the re-segregation of public schools as parents choose charter schools 
populated by people of similar ethnicity, faith, and socioeconomic 
status.10 
The policy arguments—both pro and con—surrounding charter 
schools are often fraught with emotion.11 After all, the well-being of 
North Carolina’s children and broader society are at stake. However, 
those heated policy arguments are not what this Article is about. 
Instead, it will focus on a heretofore unexamined but crucially 
important legal issue related to North Carolina charter schools12: 
whether they are complying with state and federal laws governing 
nonprofit charitable organizations. 
In North Carolina, as in most other states with charter schools, 
the enabling legislation requires that the charters—the written 
agreements that spell out the obligations of school organizers and 
 
student achievement”); RICHARD BUDDIN, THE IMPACT OF CHARTER SCHOOLS ON 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS 6 (CATO Inst., Policy Analysis No. 707, 
2012), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/impact-charter-schools-
public-private-school-enrollments (summarizing various studies that generally conclude 
that learning outcomes were no better at charter schools as compared to traditional public 
schools); LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLA., STATEWIDE STUDY ON SCHOOL 
CHOICE AND CONSENSUS REPORT ON CHARTER SCHOOLS 12–13 (2014) (concluding, 
among other things, that Florida charter schools perform no better and tend to be more 
segregated than traditional public schools); Rab, supra note 8 (arguing it is a subject of 
great debate whether charter schools perform as well as traditional public schools and 
citing the Stanford study concluding that only seventeen percent of charter schools 
outperformed public schools). 
 10. See Henig, supra note 8, at 23 (arguing that charter school supporters generally 
admit that charter schools tend not to be diverse but defend them as often “targeting 
minority communities”); LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLA., supra note 9, at 12 
(concluding that charter schools in Florida have increased segregation); Black, supra note 
5, at 465–66 (arguing that charter school and voucher programs permit parents to dissent 
against integration and pointing out that North Carolina’s Charlotte-Mecklenburg School 
District has in the last decade amassed the largest charter school population in the state in 
terms of percentage and also has become the most segregated district in the state); Quick 
Facts: Charter Schools, PUB. SCH. FIRST NC, http://www.publicschoolsfirstnc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/9-30-14-QUICK-FACTS-Charter-Schools.pdf (last modified Sept. 
30, 2014) (citing national studies and North Carolina-specific evidence showing that North 
Carolina charter schools tend to be racially isolated and disproportionately serve higher 
income students). 
 11. See Noguera, supra note 4 (claiming recent policy debates over charter schools are 
becoming “increasingly acrimonious”); see also O’Brien, supra note 3, at 137–38 
(“[D]ecisions about the public school curriculum give rise to particularly heated conflicts 
and controversy.”). 
 12. See Black, supra note 5, at 446 (arguing that most of the discourse regarding 
charter schools and vouchers has been about whether they produce better educational 
outcomes); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Follow the Money: Charter Schools and Financial 
Accountability, 44 URB. LAW. 37, 41–42 (2012) (arguing that most charter school 
scholarship focuses on their educational utility). 
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grant them the formal right to create and maintain schools using 
public funds13—be held by charitable nonprofit corporations.14 In 
most cases, those charitable corporations themselves take on the tasks 
of planning and running the new schools: developing learning goals 
and curricula, hiring and firing administrators and teachers, renting or 
purchasing facilities and equipment, and myriad other tasks.15 In some 
cases, however, the nonprofit charter-holders turn most or all of the 
schools’ educational and administrative functions over to a separate 
nonprofit or for-profit company, variously referred to as a charter 
management organization (“CMO”) or educational management 
organization (“EMO”).16 Often, such management organizations are 
regional or national in scope, managing numerous schools in a 
number of different states.17 They claim to enhance public education 
by introducing innovative curricula and by more nimbly serving the 
educational needs of students and families.18 They say not only that 
 
 13. See Julia L. Davis, Contracts, Control and Charter Schools: The Success of Charter 
Schools Depends on Stronger Nonprofit Board Oversight to Preserve Independence and 
Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management Companies, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 6 
(2011) (noting that a charter is a sort of contract that outlines the obligations of the 
school). 
 14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218.1(a) (2014); see also Davis, supra note 13, at 7 
(noting that only a few states allow for-profits to hold charters). 
 15. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., CMO AND EMO PUBLIC CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: A GROWING PHENOMENON IN THE CHARTER SCHOOL SECTOR, at 2 tbl.1, 
app. A (2014), available at http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01
/NAPCS-CMO-EMO-DASHBOARD-DETAILS_20111103T102812.pdf (stating that in 
the 2009–2010 school year, 71.3% of charter schools were “freestanding” or non-
CMO/EMO; for the 2009–2010 school year, 93% of North Carolina charter schools were 
“freestanding” (89 out of 96 schools)). 
 16. The terms CMO and EMO are not employed consistently in charter school 
literature. Some commentators use them interchangeably to refer to any management 
organization, whether for-profit or nonprofit. Others employ the term CMO to refer to 
nonprofit management organizations and EMO to refer to for-profit management 
organizations. See, e.g., ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE 
OVERSIGHT 6 (2014), available at http://annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files
/CharterAccountabilityStds.pdf (defining CMO and EMO). In this Article, I will follow 
what appears to be the trend by referring to “management organizations” when I mean all 
such organizations, CMOs or nonprofit management organization when I mean 
nonprofits, and EMOs or for-profit management organization when I refer to for-profits. 
 17. See John E. Chubb, Should Charter Schools Be a Cottage Industry?, in CHARTER 
SCHOOLS AGAINST THE ODDS, supra note 3, at 127, 145 (“For the most part [for-profit 
EMOs] have concentrated geographically . . . . Yet, some organizations have chosen to set 
up shop in many states.”). In 2006, some for-profit CMOs were operating in up to eighteen 
states, with EMO’s representing an average of 20.1 schools and CMOs representing an 
average of 10.1 schools. Id. at 146. 
 18. See BRYAN C. HASSEL, THE CHARTER SCHOOL CHALLENGE: AVOIDING THE 
PITFALLS, FULFILLING THE PROMISE 131–32 (1999) (“[T]here is evidence that charter 
schools link their practices together in comprehensive ‘innovation systems’ to focus on a 
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their educational methods are better than traditional public schools, 
but also that their management techniques are more effective and 
efficient, partly because they adhere to the discipline of the market 
and partly because they create economies of scale by purchasing in 
bulk and pooling aspects of back-office resources among the many 
schools they manage.19 
North Carolina law requires charter-holders to be nonprofit 
corporations,20 so it stands to reason that those corporations must 
comply with state and federal nonprofit law, whether the nonprofit 
corporations manage their charter schools independently or contract 
out the management functions. However, until now, no one has 
carefully examined whether those nonprofit charter-holding 
corporations are in fact complying with nonprofit law.21 There has 
been legal commentary on whether charter schools and other state 
institutions are complying fully with North Carolina’s charter-
enabling statute,22 and there have been legal debates over whether 
charter schools are subject to open meetings and public records 
laws.23 But no one has examined North Carolina charter schools 
through the lens of nonprofit law. This Article aims to fill that void. 
 
coherent mission . . . . [T]he broader institutional regime through which charter schools 
come to be and in which they are regulated is itself a genuine innovation.”). 
 19. MICHAEL FABRICANT & MICHELLE FINE, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE 
CORPORATE MAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: WHAT’S AT STAKE? 32 (2012) (“The 
scaling up of charter reform from individual schools to network is widely assumed to be 
the only way to ensure the economies of scale necessary to fulfill the infrastructural needs 
of charters including . . . billing departments, technology support services, record keeping, 
and teacher training that might otherwise be unavailable.”). 
 20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218.1(a) (2014). 
 21. See Frequent Questions, N.C. ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., 
http://nccharterschools.org/resources/faqs (last visited Aug. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Frequent 
Questions] (discussing various state and federal laws that North Carolina charter schools 
must comply with but failing to mention nonprofit law). 
 22. See, e.g., Lukasik, supra note 7, at 1897–1911 (describing litigation of contested 
interpretations of the North Carolina enabling statute’s funding formula). 
 23. See, e.g., Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 
2010) (stating that the Arizona Attorney General concluded charter schools were subject 
to open meeting laws); Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 
574 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“The mere opportunity to be present at the end-stage of a behind-
the-scenes evaluation process is not the equivalent of having an opportunity to be involved in 
the development of the standards, policies, and procedures that will govern that process.”); 
Zager v. Chester Cmty. Charter Sch., 934 A.2d 1227, 1232–33 (Pa. 2007) (holding that charter 
schools in Pennsylvania are subject to the Right-to-Know Act and are subject to public 
disclosure); Ann Doss Helms, NC Education Officials: Charter Schools Must Disclose 
Salaries, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news
/local/education/article9113006.html; Ann Doss Helms, Some NC Charter Schools Violate 
Open Meetings Law, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver 
.com/news/local/education/article9104393.html. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015) 
1764 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
B. The Roadmap 
This Introduction concludes by describing the Article’s 
methodological approach to studying the nonprofit legal compliance 
(or noncompliance) of North Carolina charter schools. Part I provides 
needed context by briefly describing the history of the charter school 
movement in North Carolina and across the United States. It also 
summarizes North Carolina’s charter school statute, including 
significant recent changes to that law. Part II introduces several key 
state and federal nonprofit legal doctrines and offers illustrative 
examples of what actions North Carolina charter-holders should be 
taking to comply with those laws. At the state level, the legal 
doctrines include the nonprofit corporate fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience, and at the federal level, they include the 
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) operational test, the private 
inurement doctrine, the private benefit doctrine, and the intermediate 
sanctions regime. Part III shares some preliminary observations about 
whether a select group of North Carolina charter-holding nonprofit 
corporations are in fact complying with those state and federal 
nonprofit laws. The Article concludes by arguing that at least some 
charter schools are not complying with their nonprofit law 
obligations. It also offers a few recommendations about legal and 
regulatory reforms that state officials should consider. The Article’s 
goal is to provide readers with a rough snapshot of North Carolina 
charter schools’ compliance with nonprofit law and to act as an 
instructional roadmap to guide nonprofit charter-holding 
corporations, and their boards of directors in particular, in the future. 
C. Methodology 
As of May 2015, North Carolina has 146 charter schools in 
existence, with sixteen set to open for the 2015–2016 academic year 
and many more in the near future.24 Whether one applauds or 
opposes this rapid growth, the large number of schools means that 
one legal scholar, even one working with the aid of a dedicated 
research assistant, cannot hope to thoroughly examine the nonprofit 
legal compliance of all of them. I therefore bit off a smaller, more 
manageable chunk by selecting twenty-one schools for closer 
examination. 
This Article does not claim to be a scientific, randomized control 
study. In fact, the choice of these twenty-one schools was not at all 
 
 24. Approved Charter Schools, PUB. SCH. OF N.C., http://www.ncpublicschools.org
/charterschools/schools/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2015). 
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random. Because legal compliance is particularly challenging where 
nonprofit organizations enter into comprehensive contracts with for-
profit entities, I included in my study group all fifteen North Carolina 
schools managed by for-profit management organizations. At present, 
there are three such companies active in the state: Roger Bacon 
Academy (“RBA”), National Heritage Academies (“NHA”), and 
Charter Schools USA (“CSUSA”). To draw comparisons between 
the legal compliance of for-profit and nonprofit management 
companies, I included three North Carolina charter schools managed 
by the Knowledge is Power Program (“KIPP”), a nationally 
prominent CMO. Finally, I examined three independent charter 
schools, but even they were not randomly selected; I chose them for 
geographic diversity, but also because all three posted their board 
meeting minutes and other corporate documents on their websites. 
This public availability not only made my task easier, but also 
provided an obvious sign that the organizations are at least somewhat 
transparent and, therefore, presumably more likely to be in general 
legal compliance. 
Once I identified my sample group, I examined as much 
information as I could find about each school, relying primarily on 
documents available on the public record. Where possible, I 
examined IRS Forms 1023 (the form that nonprofit organizations use 
to apply for 501(c)(3) status) and recent IRS Forms 990 (nonprofit 
organizations’ annual informational returns), articles of 
incorporation, bylaws, conflict of interest policies, CMO or EMO 
management contracts, and original applications to the North 
Carolina Office of Charter Schools.25 
Several nonprofit legal doctrines focus on board members’ 
deliberative processes, asking, for example, whether they properly 
monitor their organizations’ finances, whether they engage in 
appropriate comparison shopping, and whether they carefully 
scrutinize potential conflict of interest transactions. To gain insight 
into these questions, I filed public records requests with each of the 
schools, asking them to provide copies of all board and committee 
meeting minutes (including the board packets associated with each 
meeting), as well as copies of all vendor and service contracts the 
organizations had entered into and additional information on the 
 
 25. The charter applications, including their appendices, provided a trove of useful 
information including draft corporate policies and, for CMO- and EMO-managed schools, 
unsigned model management contracts. Unfortunately, the North Carolina Office of 
Charter Schools only posts electronic versions of applications filed after 2012. 
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schools’ annual projected budgets.26 I spent countless hours combing 
through all of this information, assessing the schools’ corporate 
governance practices and legal compliance based on my many years 
of experience advising and representing charitable organizations and 
teaching a law school course called The Law of Nonprofit 
Organizations. As mentioned at the start of this discussion, my study 
cannot claim to be random, scientific, or comprehensive, but it does 
include a thorough examination of a subset of North Carolina 
nonprofit charter-holding corporations through the eyes of an 
experienced practitioner and academic. 
I.  CHARTER SCHOOLS AND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
The history of charter schools in North Carolina and across much 
of the United States has been marked by bipartisan support, two 
decades of rapid expansion, and, more recently, dissention. 
A. Defining Charter Schools 
Charter schools began to emerge across the United States in the 
1990s, and North Carolina was part of the first wave.27 Since those 
early days, the number of charter schools has grown dramatically. 
During the 1999–2000 school year, there were approximately 1,542 
charter schools in the United States, compared to an estimated 6,440 
as of the 2013–2014 school year.28 North Carolina charter schools 
have followed a similar growth pattern. In the 1997–1998 school year, 
the first year that charters were permitted in the state, thirty-four 
 
 26. My records request was only moderately successful. Two of the three for-profit 
management companies active in North Carolina—CSUSA and NHA—provided all of the 
documents I requested. Legal counsel for the third—RBA—initially contacted me to warn that 
I would be charged for all of the necessary copying and that it would prove expensive; this in 
spite of the fact that all other schools that responded to my request furnished electronic copies 
free of charge. Ultimately, RBA furnished no documents, which is not surprising given that it 
has waged extended legal battles with at least one North Carolina newspaper to avoid 
responding to record requests. See Caitlin Dineen, StarNews Modifies its Public Records 
Request of Charter Day School Inc., STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20140820/ARTICLES/140829960/0/search 
(describing the newspaper’s ongoing legal battle with Charter Day School, managed by 
RBA, to comply with its public records request). Charter schools managed by KIPP, a 
nonprofit CMO, were reasonably responsive, as was the independently managed Tiller 
Academy. One of my requests failed due to my own clerical error, and two of the 
independent schools simply did not respond to my request, though U.S. Postal Service 
records indicate that they received them. 
 27. Lukasik, supra note 7, at 1887–88. 
 28. Total Number of Charter Schools: 2013–2014 National, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. 
CHARTER SCH., http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/overview
/year/2014 (last visited Aug. 16, 2015). 
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charter schools opened their doors.29 By 2014, there were 148 charter 
schools in the state serving almost 70,000 students.30 
Charter schools are publicly funded, privately run schools that 
are tuition-free for students.31 Since the beginning of the charter 
school movement, proponents have justified charters as “allowing 
individual choice [that] will stimulate competition among public 
schools and eventually result in a general improvement of those 
schools.”32 To allow for innovation,33 charter schools are exempt from 
most of the rules, regulations, and statutes that apply to other public 
schools,34 though they are subject to the same testing requirements.35 
North Carolina charter schools, for example, “are not required to 
follow state-mandated unit plans or to coordinate their textbook[ 
selection and purchasing] with the state department of public 
instruction.”36 Also, charter schools generally are permitted to “hire 
teachers without regard to professional certification or educational 
background[,]”37 and are allowed to hire and fire them without 
according them the same substantive and procedural protections 
enjoyed by teachers at traditional public schools.38 Finally, charters 
are not told how to spend their money. They receive their funds in 
block grants, and although the boards that govern the nonprofit 
charter-holding corporations must account for the money and 
regularly audit the schools’ spending, they are free to allocate the 
funds as they see fit.39 
Charter schools in North Carolina receive taxpayer funds based 
on the number of students enrolled, meaning that when a child 
transfers from a traditional public school to a charter, the taxpayer 
 
 29. The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Rab, supra note 8. 
 32. Andrew Broy, Charter Schools and Education Reform: How State Constitutional 
Challenges Will Alter Charter School Legislation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 493, 516 (2001). 
 33. See id. at 495 (arguing that North Carolina charter schools were originally 
considered educational laboratories to test new methods of instruction). 
 34. See id. at 526–27; The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1. 
 35. Broy, supra note 32, at 515. 
 36. Id. at 514. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See FABRICANT & FINE, supra note 19, at 82 (“[A]ccording to charter advocates 
and their allies, . . . unions have protected incompetent classroom instructors, supported a 
tenure system that guarantees lifetime employment to teachers not producing results in 
the classroom, resisted new forms of measurable accountability, and lobbied legislators 
with substantial resources to protect their interests . . . .”). 
 39. See Broy, supra note 32, at 514, 528. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015) 
1768 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
funding follows her.40 Depending on the size of a given charter 
school’s student body and the per-pupil spending of the traditional 
public schools from which the charter school draws its students,41 a 
single charter school can take in many millions of dollars in gross 
revenue in a single school year.42 
In spite of their access to public funding, charter schools are not 
created or regulated in consultation with local school districts or their 
elected representatives.43 Groups or individuals who want to open a 
charter school must instead submit a detailed application to the newly 
created North Carolina Charter Schools Advisory Board.44 The 
Advisory Board reviews the applications and makes 
recommendations to the state board of education about which 
organizations should receive a charter.45 If and when a charter is 
granted to the nonprofit applicant, that organization’s board of 
directors, which in some instances is elected by school parents and in 
others is self-perpetuating, is left to govern the school with 
oversight—some would argue loose oversight46—provided by the 
North Carolina Office of Charter Schools.47 
The original North Carolina charter school legislation was 
ratified in 1996 and authorized the establishment of up to one 
 
 40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218.105(c) (2014); see also Lukasik, supra note 7, at 
1894–98 (advocating for a change in charter school funding to eliminate the comingling of 
charter school and traditional public school funding); Rab, supra note 8 (explaining that 
charter schools receive taxpayer funds based on the number of students enrolled). 
 41. See § 115C-218.105(c); Broy, supra note 32, at 512–13 (explaining charter schools’ 
per-pupil funding formula). 
 42. See, e.g., Queen’s Grant Cmty. Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization 
Exempt from Income Tax pt. I (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2011) (reporting approximately 
$9.4 million in gross revenue). 
 43. Rab, supra note 8. 
 44. See § 115C-218(b) (creating the Charter School Advisory Board). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, supra note 16, at 12 (arguing that 
across the United States monitoring and oversight by state agencies has not kept pace with 
the exponential growth in the number of charter schools); Erin Tracy-Blackwood, North 
Carolina Charter Schools Poised to Rake in Millions, CREATIVE LOAFING CHARLOTTE 
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://clclt.com/charlotte/north-carolina-charter-schools-are-poised-to-rake-
in-millions/Content?oid=3469335 (arguing that until recently the State Office of Charter 
Schools employed only three consultants to monitor 133 schools and now employs eight 
consultants to monitor 153 schools, a ratio far below the national average); The Facts on 
Charter Schools, supra note 1. 
 47. Charter Schools, PUB. SCH. OF N.C., OFFICE OF CHARTER SCH., http://
www.ncpublicschools.org/charterschools/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2014) (stating that its 
“Division Mission” is to “provide[] leadership to establish and engage a quality charter 
school culture resulting in legal compliance, board performance, financial integrity, and 
academic excellence”). 
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hundred charter schools across the state.48 The law’s express intent 
was to provide greater choice and learning opportunities (with special 
emphasis on creating opportunities for learning disabled and 
academically gifted students), offer new professional opportunities 
for educators, and explore novel approaches to teaching and 
learning.49 As will be discussed below, that original intent has recently 
evolved. 
Support for charter schools tends to be bipartisan at both the 
state and federal levels,50 though the different ends of the political 
spectrum support them for different reasons.51 The political right 
applauds charter schools because they promote “school choice” and 
facilitate the introduction of market forces, such as competition and 
efficiency to public education.52 The left tends to focus on the fact that 
charters facilitate community control and can create access to quality 
public education for low-income and minority students.53 
Given that political control in North Carolina recently switched 
to Republican hands for the first time in a century,54 and that the 
state’s political climate has been fiercely, even toxically, partisan ever 
since,55 it is important to recall that the state’s original charter 
legislation was adopted with bipartisan support,56 even if Republicans 
and Democrats have disagreed about more recent changes to the 
state’s charter legislation.57 
B. Evolution of North Carolina Charter School Laws and Practices 
Recent changes to charter school legislation have been rapid and 
numerous. For example, in 2011, North Carolina Senate Bill 8 
 
 48. The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Davis, supra note 13, at 6–7 (noting that No Child Left Behind legislation, 
supported by the Obama administration, creates strong incentives for the creation and/or 
expansion of charter schools across the United States). 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 6. 
 53. Id. at 6–7. 
 54. Rab, supra note 8. 
 55. See, e.g., John Drescher, Drescher: Politics and the School Board, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Sept. 9, 2012, at A1 (describing how, while designed to be 
nonpartisan, the North Carolina school board operates in a “partisan manner”); Charles 
Meeker & Richard Vinroot, A Needed End to Gerrymandering, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh), May 22, 2014, at A17 (discussing how gerrymandering leads to “legislative 
gridlock in a toxic polarizing environment”). 
 56. Frequent Questions, supra note 21 (noting that North Carolina’s public charter 
school legislation came about due to the bipartisan leadership of a liberal Senate 
Democrat (Wilber Gully) and a conservative House Republican (Steve Wood)). 
 57. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
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removed the provision that had limited the number of North Carolina 
charter schools to one hundred at any given time, creating the 
possibility of an unlimited number of charter schools in the state.58 
The same bill eliminated limits on charter school enrollment 
increases, lowered minimum enrollment numbers (meaning that 
nonprofit organizations could operate charter schools even if they had 
managed to enroll only a handful of students), and removed 
provisions intended to prevent schools from being created to serve 
only specific subcategories of students (e.g., gifted students, students 
with disabilities, and students of the same gender).59 The bill also 
removed the clear expectation that charter schools would be required 
to participate in the public school student accountability program.60 
Soon after state legislators lifted the hundred-school cap on 
charters, they also created the North Carolina Public Charter Schools 
Advisory Council (“Advisory Council” or “Council”), mentioned 
above, to help oversee the schools and make recommendations to the 
Board of Education.61 Fifteen panelists were appointed to the 
Advisory Council by Governor Bev Perdue, Republican legislators, 
and State Superintendent June Atkinson.62 Critics of this regulatory 
structure pointed out that eleven of the Council members were either 
charter advocates or had helped run charter schools,63 and that the 
Council included members associated with for-profit management 
companies whose profits depend partly on the Council’s decisions.64 
Once the legislature removed quantitative limits, the number of 
charter schools in North Carolina increased rapidly.65 In 2012, the 
state board of education approved twenty-three new charter schools. 
 
 58. Act of June 17, 2011, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 647, 647–48 (codified as amended at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218 (2014)); see also The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1 
(summarizing the legislative changes). 
 59. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 647–48; see also The Facts on Charter Schools, supra 
note 1 (summarizing legislative changes). 
 60. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 647. North Carolina’s public school accountability 
program tracks the performance of public schools through student testing and compares 
achievement levels among schools within the state and across the United States. See 
generally Accountability Services, PUB. SCH. OF N.C., http://www.ncpublicschools.org
/accountability/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2015) (aggregating North Carolina testing and 
assessment information and links). 
 61. Rab, supra note 8. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Marian Wang, Charter School Leader Turns Public Education into Private 
Profits, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.starnewsonline.com
/article/20141015/ARTICLES/141019827/0/search [hereinafter Wang I]. 
 65. See The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1. 
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Nine were approved in 2011 as part of a “fast track” process.66 As of 
March 2015, the Board of Education granted final approval to sixteen 
new charter schools, meaning there soon will be 162 such schools in 
the state.67 
An important phenomenon that has accompanied the growth in 
charter schools is the increasing number managed by charter 
management organizations, particularly for-profit management 
organizations. According to the National Alliance for Charter 
Schools, an organization that advocates for charter schools and 
encourages their growth, as of 2010–2011 (the latest year for which 
statistics are available), 20.2% of charter schools nationwide were 
managed by nonprofit CMOs and 12.3% by for-profit EMOs.68 
Across the United States, the most recent trend has been a decrease 
in the number of for-profit managed schools, at least partly because 
they have been prone to scandal and legislators in jurisdictions such 
as Michigan and Pennsylvania have passed laws to more tightly 
regulate them.69 But North Carolina appears to be headed in the 
opposite direction; since the hundred-school cap has been lifted, and 
since decision making regarding new charters has been turned over to 
a council that is friendly to CMO- and EMO-managed charter 
schools, the numbers appear to be on the rise.70 In recent years, the 
Council has approved six new charter schools managed by for-profit 
companies.71 Critics are particularly concerned about the rise of 
EMO-managed charter schools, fearing that they prioritize profit over 
educational outcomes and that, nationwide, their academic 
achievement records are poor72—this, at a time when the state’s 
 
 66. See id.; Lynn Bonner, State Board Set to Approve ‘Fast Track’ for Charter 
Schools and Online Charter Plan, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 3, 2014), http://
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/education/article9160313.html (referring to the 
increased use of “fast track” approval for North Carolina charter school operators who 
already have proved successful in starting a charter school). 
 67. List of Approved Charter Schools, supra note 24. 
 68. Schools by Management Organization: 2010–2011 National, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR 
PUB. CHARTER SCH., http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/mgmt
/year/2011 (last visited Aug. 21, 2015). 
 69. See Patrick J. Gallo, Jr., Reforming the “Business” of Charter Schools in 
Pennsylvania, 2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 207, 230–31 (2014) (“The Pennsylvania General 
Assembly has recognized this need for reform and ‘the need to promote more sensible 
funding, quality in planning and governance, better fiscal and educational accountability, 
and more transparency in operations.’ ”). 
 70. See Rab, supra note 8. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See GARY MIRON ET AL., NAT'L EDUC. POLICY CTR., PROFILES OF FOR-PROFIT 
AND NONPROFIT EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS: THIRTEENTH ANNUAL 
REPORT—2010–2011, at v (2012), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/EMO-profiles-10-11_0.pdf 
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regulatory institutions have failed to keep pace with the rapid 
growth.73 
II.  NONPROFIT LAW APPLICABLE TO NORTH CAROLINA CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 
To the uninitiated, the law of nonprofit organizations can be 
confounding because it is derived from a multiplicity of sources: a 
blend of state and federal law74 with roots in the laws of trusts, 
corporations, and taxation.75 In recent decades, courts and legislators 
across the country have added some clarity by increasingly relying on 
corporate law (as opposed to trust law), but inconsistency and 
confusion persist.76 Determining whether charter schools in North 
Carolina are complying with nonprofit law thus requires the 
introduction and explanation of several legal concepts. For the sake 
of order and simplicity, the following discussion divides the world of 
nonprofit doctrines into state and federal, though, as the analysis will 
reveal, they often overlap. 
A. State Nonprofit Law Doctrines 
For historical reasons, most nonprofit organizations in the 
United States are formed as corporations.77 As in the for-profit world, 
overall responsibility for each corporation rests with its board of 
directors.78 Nonprofit commentators generally agree that the board’s 
job is not to micromanage the organization’s day-to-day activities, but 
to establish and monitor the organization’s mission; hire, evaluate, 
and, if necessary, fire the organization’s chief executive; periodically 
assess the organization’s overall performance; ensure that its finances 
are in order; and, crucially, verify that the organization is in 
 
(reporting that, of the schools managed by for-profit EMOs that had annual yearly 
progress ratings in the 2010–2011 school year, 51.8% did not meet state standards). 
 73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 74. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3 
(10th ed. 2011) (listing various state and federal laws that apply to nonprofit 
organizations). 
 75. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 347, 351 (2012) [hereinafter Hazen & Hazen [Pa.]]. 
 76. See id. at 352. 
 77. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 52 (4th ed. 2010). 
 78. Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose is Not Good for the Gander: 
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1984–85 (2007). 
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compliance with relevant laws.79 These board responsibilities, 
imposed by state law, are generally described as fiduciary duties,80 
and scholars and practitioners group them into three categories: care, 
loyalty, and obedience.81 For reasons discussed below, fiduciary duties 
do not lend themselves to bright-line formulae,82 and at least one 
leading treatise claims that “[t]he fiduciary obligation is notably 
elusive as a concept.”83 Still, North Carolina nonprofit law does assign 
fiduciary duties to nonprofit board members and, in fact, interprets 
those duties more strictly than many other jurisdictions.84 
1.  Duty of Care 
The duty of care is in essence a duty to pay close attention to the 
goings-on of the corporation. Complying with this duty requires at a 
minimum that directors show up to board and committee meetings 
and read and evaluate the information that staff and other directors 
and officers present to them.85 But the duty of care requires board 
members to be more than mere passive recipients of corporate 
information.86 They also must ensure that the organization is acting 
properly and in adherence with the law, and they have a duty to dig 
 
 79. See id. (arguing that the “board must monitor management, make decisions 
regarding the high-level direction of the organization, and approve its major 
transactions”); see also BUS. LAW SECTION OF THE N.C. BAR ASS’N & N.C. CTR. FOR 
NONPROFITS, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NORTH CAROLINA NONPROFIT 
CORPORATIONS 27–28 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter N.C. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS] 
(arguing that North Carolina law requires board members to oversee operations, insist on 
regular reports, and be on the lookout for mismanagement, illegality, or other 
improprieties); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate 
Directors—Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1869–70 (2012) 
[hereinafter Hazen & Hazen [N.C.]] (stating that the director’s “duty of oversight is 
premised on a duty to keep informed and to assure the organization is operating 
properly”). 
 80. It should go without saying that just as for-profit corporations are subject to a 
multiplicity of state laws beyond fiduciary duties, so too are nonprofits. To name just a 
few, they must comply with labor and employment laws, land use planning and zoning 
laws, and—unique to nonprofit organizations—charitable solicitation laws. 
 81. See Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1861–67 (describing all three 
fiduciary duties under North Carolina law). 
 82. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 349. 
 83. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 134. 
 84. See Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1872, 1867–68 (arguing that North 
Carolina declined to adopt recent proposed amendments to nonprofit law that would have 
narrowed the scope of nonprofit directors’ fiduciary duties and that the state interprets 
those duties strictly). 
 85. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 151–52. 
 86. Id. at 152 (arguing every director must “take steps to become knowledgeable 
about background facts and circumstances before taking action” or approving others’ 
actions on behalf of the corporation). 
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into the facts when they suspect that something is amiss.87 If, for 
example, a board member has reason to believe that staff members of 
a nonprofit organization are not fully informing the board about an 
important operational or financial issue, she has a legal duty to step 
in, insist on receiving the relevant information, closely examine the 
details, and satisfy herself that the organization is acting properly.88 A 
director is permitted to rely on information provided by others, but 
only if she reasonably believes that the contents of the report or 
expert opinion are accurate, and she honestly assumes that the agents 
presenting such reports are doing so within their professional 
competence.89 
In determining whether a given director has complied with her 
duty of care, North Carolina law applies a reasonableness standard, 
asking whether a reasonable director in like circumstances would 
have acted similarly.90 Often, nonprofit directors’ breaches of their 
duty of care arise because they believe that it is bad manners to ask 
probing questions of their organizations’ managers, outside experts, 
and fellow board members; however, according to the law, ask they 
must.91 
To provide a simple duty of care example specific to the North 
Carolina charter school context, if a director were presented with a 
financial report that contained line-item categories so general that she 
could not accurately determine what the money was being spent on, 
she would have a legal obligation to insist on a more detailed report 
with more specific information. 
As discussed above in Section I.A, debates concerning North 
Carolina charter schools’ legal compliance tend to focus on per-pupil 
financial allocations and the proper application of North Carolina’s 
open records laws. These discussions overlook the fact that, because 
the charter-holding organizations are nonprofit, their directors must 
 
 87. Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1870. 
 88. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 152; Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 
79, at 1870. 
 89. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 152. 
 90. Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1861–63 (arguing that some states have 
weakened their duty of care standards by focusing more on the director’s subjective state 
of mind and whether she believed she was acting reasonably); see also Hazen & Hazen 
[Pa.], supra note 75, at 356 (describing the duty of care as “basically a negligence standard 
as it requires directors to act in a manner consistent with reasonably prudent directors 
under like circumstances”). 
 91. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 153; see also infra notes 120–24 and 
accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of board capture). 
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comply with North Carolina’s nonprofit laws, including the fiduciary 
duty of care. 
2.  Duty of Loyalty 
While the duty of care focuses on process—asking whether 
nonprofit directors have paid sufficiently close attention and sought 
out clear information where it was lacking—the duty of loyalty is 
substantive, focusing on the director’s motives, purposes, and goals.92 
Boiled down to its essence, the duty of loyalty forbids nonprofit 
directors from engaging in self-dealing, also referred to as “interested 
transactions.”93 
Stated more expansively, the duty of loyalty requires a director 
to act in the nonprofit organization’s best interests, even if it means 
harming her own.94 Not only must the director avoid harming the 
corporation, she must avoid using her position to obtain a benefit or 
advantage for herself that might more properly belong to the 
corporation.95 The paradigmatic example of such a breach is where a 
director is on both sides of a business transaction that involves the 
nonprofit organization. Imagine, for example, an insurance executive 
who serves on a nonprofit board that is shopping for insurance 
coverage.96 If the executive uses his position and influence on the 
board to steer the insurance contract to his own company and insulate 
his company from market competition, he clearly has violated his 
duty of loyalty toward the nonprofit.97 
This prohibition on self-dealing would, of course, include a 
prohibition against a board member using her position to arrange or 
approve an unwarranted expenditure of the organization’s assets 
(also known as “corporate waste”)98 where that expenditure directly 
or indirectly benefits the board member. To take an obvious example 
from the charter school context, a director who serves on the board of 
a nonprofit charter-holding corporation and who also is a principal of 
a for-profit charter management company would be violating his duty 
of loyalty if he were to use his influence to steer business and profits 
toward his own company without ensuring that the same services 
 
 92. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 380–81. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1849. 
 95. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 163. 
 96. See id. at 178–87 (presenting excerpts and analyzing a duty of loyalty case 
involving the sale of insurance to a nonprofit organization). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 165 (employing the term “corporate waste”). 
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could not be obtained more economically elsewhere. Likewise, it 
would be a breach of the duty of loyalty if a director were to actively 
assist another director in such conduct.99 
It is important to emphasize that in some instances interested 
transactions—that is, business transactions that feature one or more 
directors on both sides—are not prohibited by state law and in fact 
can be a healthy necessity.100 To return to the example of the director 
who is also an insurance salesman, it may be that without that board 
member’s intervention to persuade his own company to provide 
coverage, the organization would not be able to obtain insurance, at 
least not at a price it could afford. In such an instance, the director 
has reaped no direct or indirect benefit, the nonprofit organization 
has not been harmed, and there is no breach of loyalty. 
However, any nonprofit organization contemplating such a 
transaction should strictly follow a procedure to examine and, in 
effect, sanitize the transaction in advance.101 Ideally, the procedure 
will be laid out in detail in the organization’s written conflict of 
interest policy.102 Typically, the procedure involves the board asking 
the interested director for information and requiring him to remain in 
the presence of the board to respond to questions and challenges.103 
Once the disinterested directors possess sufficient information, they 
should ask the interested director to leave while they analyze the 
information and decide if the transaction is in the corporation’s best 
interests.104 A properly functioning board of directors would not vote 
on such a transaction without investigating alternative sources and 
engaging in comparative shopping.105 Their investigation and 
discussion concluded, the disinterested directors should vote, outside 
the presence of any interested directors, on whether the proposed 
transaction is in the organization’s best interests.106 Importantly, the 
disinterested directors should carefully document all of these 
 
 99. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 382. 
 100. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 165. 
 101. See id. 186 (referring to duty of loyalty “sanitation” procedures); N.C. 
GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS, supra note 79, at 30–31. 
 102. Neither North Carolina nor federal law requires nonprofit organizations to have 
written conflict-of-interest policies, but the IRS encourages organizations to adopt them 
and they have become a settled aspect of nonprofit corporate best practice in recent years. 
See N.C. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS, supra note 79, at 10. 
 103. See id. at 30. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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sanitizing procedures in their board meeting minutes in case legal 
authorities suspect a breach of loyalty.107 
Although state law fiduciary duties are weakly enforced in many 
jurisdictions,108 nonprofit organizations and their directors are far 
more likely to be pursued for breaches of the duty of loyalty than for 
breaches of the duty of care.109 Where duty of care violations often 
result in a mere slap on the wrist, blatant self-dealing can lead to 
dissolution of the nonprofit organization under state law in addition 
to other penalties.110 
3.  Duty of Obedience 
Obedience is the forgotten fiduciary duty.111 Although less well 
known, it is a firmly established aspect of North Carolina law112 and is 
crucial for the question of charter school nonprofit legal compliance. 
The duty of obedience requires nonprofit directors to ensure that 
the corporation devotes its resources to achieving its charitable 
mission.113 The “directors may not deviate in any substantial way from 
the duty to fulfill the particular purposes for which the organization 
was created.”114 To illustrate this duty within the context of charter 
schools, if the nonprofit charter-holding corporation’s charitable 
mission is to provide high-quality education to children, but the 
directors allow the corporation to be used for commercial activity and 
the generation of excessive profits, they would be straying from their 
mission and thereby violating their duty of obedience. 
The duty of obedience is particularly crucial to the credibility and 
long-term viability of the nonprofit sector as a whole. The general 
public assumes that money and other resources given to a charity will 
be devoted to fulfilling the organization’s altruistic ends.115 Their 
confidence is based partly on the fact that charities are subject to the 
“nondistribution constraint”: the requirement that insiders to the 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. See infra notes 125–31 and accompanying text. 
 109. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 185. 
 110. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 384; see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, 
supra note 77, at 185–86 (providing examples of the consequences of self-dealing). 
 111. See Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 388–89 (arguing obedience is not as 
well known as other fiduciary duties but is well known by commentators, practitioners, 
and courts). 
 112. Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1864. 
 113. See id. at 1863; see also Jeremy Benjamin, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ 
Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1677, 1679 (2009) (describing the consequences 
of mission drift). 
 114. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 199. 
 115. Benjamin, supra note 113, at 1685–86. 
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corporation not distribute excess revenues among themselves but 
instead reinvest it in the organization’s charitable mission.116 But the 
public also relies on directors’ compliance with the duty of obedience. 
Even if they cannot name the legal doctrine,117 citizens assume that 
the individuals governing the organization will adhere to its charitable 
purpose.118 When charitable nonprofit organizations drift from their 
missions by, for example, allowing themselves to be used for the 
generation of profits for insiders, the public loses confidence, not only 
in that charity but also in the nonprofit sector as a whole.119 
4.  Board Capture and Weak Enforcement 
Before shifting the focus to federal nonprofit law doctrines that 
apply to charter schools, it is important to highlight two additional 
points concerning state law fiduciary duties. First, these duties are 
sometimes difficult for directors to adhere to because of the 
phenomenon of “board capture.” Second, the enforcement of state 
nonprofit laws, especially directors’ fiduciary duties, is generally lax. 
Nonprofit directors’ independent decision making, and thus their 
compliance with state law fiduciary duties, is often undermined by the 
belief that board membership is a gentile world and that directors are 
impolite if they pose probing, potentially embarrassing questions to 
officers, senior staff, or outside experts.120 Studies on nonprofit board 
behavior reveal that in this atmosphere, directors rely almost 
exclusively on the organization’s senior staff to provide them with the 
information they need to make decisions on behalf of the 
corporation.121 Directors tend to rubber-stamp nonprofit managers’ 
proposals without thoroughly debating the effects those proposals 
would have on the organization, even when circumstances would 
prompt reasonable people to engage in additional investigation.122 
Interestingly, and somewhat counterintuitively, nonprofit directors’ 
deferential tendencies tend to increase along with the net worth of the 
organization.123 At the same time, nonprofit managers have come to 
expect this deference: they do what they can to prevent boards from 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Benjamin, supra note 113, at 1686. 
 119. See id. at 1677–79 (arguing there is a crisis of confidence in the nonprofit sector as 
a result of organizations drifting from their charitable missions). 
 120. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 153–54. 
 121. Mulligan, supra note 78, at 1987–88. 
 122. See id. at 1987 (citing various studies). 
 123. Id. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015) 
2015] CHARTER SCHOOLS & NONPROFIT LAW 1779 
engaging in independent decision making, and they routinely 
complain of “meddling” board members.124 
In sum, the internal structure and dynamics of nonprofit 
organizations tend not to foster independent decision-making by 
corporate boards. As the following discussion reveals, external 
enforcement of state law fiduciary duties also tends to be weak. 
Enforcement of directors’ fiduciary duties is negatively affected 
by the difficulty of obtaining standing to sue for improper board 
behavior and the lack of enforcement resources of state attorneys 
general. In some jurisdictions, it is theoretically possible for citizens to 
bring legal action to punish directors for violating their fiduciary 
duties; but to obtain standing, one must show a “special and definite 
interest,” which the general public lacks.125 This means, in effect, that 
standing is limited to other directors of the organization who, because 
of their positions, are considered to have a stake in the organization’s 
performance, and thus have the requisite special and definite interest. 
But lawsuits by directors against other directors are exceedingly rare, 
rendering this potential enforcement mechanism a chimera.126 
In most states, the attorney general is granted broad authority to 
oversee nonprofit organizations.127 Due to the standing challenges 
discussed above, it is often the attorney general or no one when it 
comes to the enforcement of nonprofit laws, including fiduciary 
duties. However, in most jurisdictions the broad authority to 
investigate and punish bad actors in the nonprofit sector is not 
matched by resources.128 
 
 124. Id. at 1987–88. 
 125. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 229; see also Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], 
supra note 79, at 1878–79 (referring to the difficulty of obtaining standing to sue nonprofit 
directors); Mulligan, supra note 78, at 1988 (“Traditionally, enforcement of nonprofit law 
has been the purview of the state attorney general.”). 
 126. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 229. Where nonprofits are formed as 
membership corporations, the members generally can obtain standing to sue. Hazen & 
Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 411–12 (referring to the possibility of members’ derivative 
actions). 
 127. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 403; see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, 
supra note 77, at 226 (arguing attorneys general represent the public in enforcing the 
purposes of the corporation); Davis, supra note 13, at 19. 
 128. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 408; see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, 
supra note 77, at 228 (arguing that “[s]taffing problems and a relative lack of interest in 
monitoring nonprofits makes attorney general oversight more theoretical than deterrent in 
most jurisdictions”); Mulligan, supra note 78, at 1991 (arguing “[m]any serious fiduciary 
violations simply fail to pique the interest of state attorneys general”). 
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This lack of resources (and perhaps interest) is evident in North 
Carolina.129 More than a decade ago, around the time I began 
teaching The Law of Nonprofit Organizations at the University of 
North Carolina School of Law, I spent most of a day on the telephone 
trying to determine who at the North Carolina Attorney General’s 
office was responsible for enforcing nonprofit law in the state. After 
being transferred to many divisions and speaking to many assistant 
attorneys general, I determined that one lawyer in the Attorney 
General’s Consumer Protection Division was responsible for 
nonprofit enforcement, but he was only able to devote a small 
percentage of his time to that task.130 In effect, there was virtually no 
enforcement of nonprofit law in North Carolina. 
Taken together, the phenomena of board capture and attorney 
general inattention mean that, too often, no one verifies that 
nonprofit charter schools are complying with state nonprofit law. As 
the following discussion will demonstrate, the federal government in 
the form of the IRS takes a more stringent approach to the 
enforcement of nonprofit law applicable to charter schools.131 
B. Federal Nonprofit Law Doctrines 
The discussion of federal nonprofit law governing charter schools 
begins with private inurement and the closely related intermediate 
sanctions doctrine. The latter is sometimes referred to as the “4958 
rules,” after the relevant section of the U.S. Treasury Code. We begin 
here not because these doctrines necessarily have the most impact on 
charter schools, but because they are clearer and more fully 
developed than other applicable federal laws. 
1.  Private Inurement and Intermediate Sanctions 
a. Private Inurement 
Charitable nonprofit organizations such as those that hold North 
Carolina school charters are prohibited by section 501(c)(3) of the 
Treasury Code from engaging in activities that result in inurement of 
the organization’s net earnings to insiders such as founders, directors, 
 
 129. See Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1879–80 (referring generally to the 
lack of nonprofit enforcement resources in the office of the North Carolina Attorney 
General). 
 130. Cf. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 228 (reporting that a recent 
telephone survey found that states dedicate a median of one full-time-equivalent attorney 
to charity oversight and that seventeen states had no such lawyers at all). 
 131. See Davis, supra note 13, at 21. 
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and officers.132 In simpler terms, individuals who use their positions of 
influence within charitable organizations to line their own pockets—
whether through payment of excessive salaries, below-market-rate 
loans and other sweetheart deals, noncompetitive bidding, payment 
of excess rent, or improper economic gain from the sale or exchange 
of property with the exempt organization—violate federal law’s 
private inurement prohibition.133 
Historically, the IRS was reluctant to find private inurement 
violations because there was only one possible penalty—revocation of 
exemption for the organization involved, otherwise known as the 
nonprofit death sentence—and the Service was loath to kill charities 
unless the violation was particularly blatant and severe.134 In 1996, the 
extreme nature of this sanction led to a new regulatory scheme that 
imposed excise taxes—in effect, fines—on individuals who wield 
influence within nonprofit organizations and use that influence to 
steer excessive economic benefits to themselves.135 
b. Intermediate Sanctions 
This new scheme was called “intermediate sanctions.”136 The 
sanctions were intermediate in that they were less harsh than the 
nonprofit death sentence but more severe than the mild slap on the 
wrist that the IRS too-often meted out for nonprofit insiders’ self-
interested behavior.137 Today, the intermediate sanctions regime has 
largely supplanted the more venerable private inurement doctrine.138 
Because they have become the IRS’s preferred cudgel for policing 
self-interested transactions by insiders, and because, as Part III of this 
Article will discuss, at least some charter school actors in North 
Carolina are arguably violating these rules, it is worth examining the 
new nomenclature they have created as well as their potential sting. 
 
 132. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 445; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2013) 
(providing charitable tax exemption only if “no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual”). 
 133. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 445; John D. Colombo, In Search of 
Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2006) (arguing the private inurement 
prohibition is well established in federal law and that its purpose is to prevent insiders 
from “siphoning off” the exempt organization’s assets by means of non-arms-length 
transactions). 
 134. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 445. 
 135. Id. at 461–62. 
 136. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1068 (using the name “intermediate sanctions” 
but also referring to the rules by their code number, section 4958). 
 137. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 462–63. 
 138. Colombo, supra note 133, at 1068. 
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Section 4958 provides for excise taxes on any “excess benefit 
transaction,” (“EBT”) defined as a transaction in which “the value of 
the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration 
[] received.”139 The sanctions only come into play when the 
transaction in question is between an exempt organization and a 
“disqualified person,” also referred to as a DQP, and defined as a 
person who during the preceding five years was “in a position to 
exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.”140 
Stated in plain English, the intermediate sanctions rules, much like 
the private inurement doctrine, will punish insiders who use their 
positions to line their pockets or “siphon off” the nonprofit 
organization’s resources.141 
The IRS has additional rules about who does and does not 
qualify as a DQP. For example, the DQP category includes family 
members of the person with substantial influence.142 Significant for 
North Carolina charter schools, it also includes controlled entities: 
corporations or partnerships where more than thirty-five percent of 
the voting power is held by DQPs.143 The most obvious examples of 
DQPs are nonprofit corporate officers, directors, trustees, and their 
close relatives, but the category encompasses anyone, regardless of 
title, who is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the 
organization.144 
The definition of DQP is important because those are the people 
subject to the most extreme financial sanctions. If a DQP is found to 
have engaged in an EBT, she first must “correct” the excess benefit 
within a specified period of time, meaning she must pay back the ill-
gotten gains and restore the charitable organization to the financial 
position it would have been in if she had been acting under the 
highest fiduciary standards.145 In addition to “correcting” the 
transaction, she must pay an initial penalty of twenty-five percent of 
 
 139. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2013). 
 140. Id. § 4958(f)(1)(A); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(a)(1) (2002) (defining a 
DQP); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 462–64 (discussing sanctions). 
 141. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1067–68 (arguing that a “DQP” is similar to 
private inurement’s “insider,” and the definition of “excess benefit transaction” means, in 
essence, “siphoning off” the organization’s resources). 
 142. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(B), (f)(4); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(b)(1) (defining 
categories of DQPs); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 464 (describing categories 
of DQPs). 
 143. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(C), (f)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(b)(2) (defining 
categories of DQPs); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 464 (describing categories 
of DQPs). 
 144. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 464.  
 145. See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(6); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(c)(2). 
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the excess benefit.146 The DQP, not the organization, must pay the 
penalty, and if she fails to do so she may be liable for an additional 
second-tier penalty of 200% of the excess benefit.147 
But that is not all. Financial penalties also may be imposed on 
one or more of the organization’s “managers” who knowingly permit 
the organization to engage in an EBT.148 Organization managers 
include officers, directors, trustees, and individuals with similar 
powers or responsibilities regardless of their titles.149 If they 
knowingly, willfully, and unreasonably approve of or otherwise 
participate in an EBT, they may be fined up to the lesser of ten 
percent of the excess benefit or $20,000.150 If two or more managers 
share responsibility for approving the prohibited transaction, they will 
be held jointly and severally liable.151 
From the perspective of nonprofit charter-holding corporations 
in North Carolina, the upshot of these section 4958 rules is that if any 
individuals affiliated with the schools’ vendors—the companies that 
provide their books, sports equipment, school facilities, teacher 
training, back-office administration, or a single company that 
provides all of these goods and services—has influence over the 
organization, whether as a result of a formal board position or not, 
that person and every member of the board of directors could be 
personally subject to harsh financial penalties if the vendor is 
receiving more than market pay for the goods and services provided. 
Before leaving the topic of section 4958, three additional features 
of the intermediate sanctions regime bear mentioning. First, although 
the intermediate sanctions regime has become the IRS’s favored 
means of punishing self-interested transactions by nonprofit 
corporate insiders, the IRS reserves the right in extreme cases of 
wrongdoing to invoke the private inurement doctrine to kill the 
nonprofit organization.152 Second, the law explicitly provides that the 
Service will be more understanding and less likely to invoke the death 
 
 146. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1); see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 463 
(explaining the initial penalty of an EBT). 
 147. I.R.C. § 4958(b); see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 463 
(explaining the liability of an EBT). 
 148. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2); see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 463 
(describing the lesser penalties that can be imposed on managers). 
 149. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2). 
 150. Id. § 4958(a)(2), (d)(2). 
 151. Id. § 4958(d)(1). 
 152. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 463; Colombo, supra note 133, at 
1083. 
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penalty where the organization identifies and corrects the EBT before 
the IRS discovers it.153 
Finally, a nonprofit organization—including a charter school—
can create a legal presumption of propriety for a transaction, even a 
transaction with a corporate insider/DQP, if it follows certain vetting 
procedures laid down by IRS regulations. Charter schools would be 
well advised to seek expert counsel on how to vet and sanitize any 
suspect transaction, but for purposes of this Article it must suffice to 
say that they should engage in thorough research to ensure that the 
amounts of money being paid to the insider/DQP are comparable to 
what they would pay on the open market,154 and to debate and vote 
on the approval of the transaction without the participation of anyone 
who might have a personal interest.155 Even if they follow these 
procedures, charter schools can still be found liable for intermediate 
sanctions, but the burden of proof in this instance shifts to the IRS, 
making prosecution less likely.156 
2.  The Operational Test and the Private Benefit Doctrine 
The operational test and the private benefit doctrine, although 
separate, are conceptually related and sometimes blend together at 
the margins.157 Combined, they are the doctrines that the IRS most 
often applies in the charter school context,158 and therefore, are the 
federal doctrines about which North Carolina charter schools should 
be most concerned. 
a. The Operational Test 
The IRS’s operational test is a gateway that all aspiring 501(c)(3) 
organizations must pass through if they wish to earn charitable tax-
exempt status.159 The test is firmly grounded in the Treasury code and 
 
 153. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(iii) (2013). 
 154. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i) (2002) (providing that a nonprofit board will have 
appropriate comparability data “if, given the knowledge and expertise of its members, it 
has information sufficient to determine whether . . . the compensation arrangement is 
reasonable or a property transfer is at fair market value”). 
 155. Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(1) to (3). 
 156. See id. § 53.4958-6; FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 468. 
 157. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 459 (arguing the private benefit 
doctrine is closely related to the operational test). 
 158. See Charter School Reference Guide, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/charter
_school_reference_guide_12-2006.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2015); Charter School Guide 
Sheet, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/charter_school_guide_sheet_12-2006.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2015). 
 159. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1081 (arguing that the operational test is at the 
heart of tax exemption decisions). 
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regulations, and requires that the organization engage “primarily in 
activities which accomplish one or more of [the] exempt purposes 
specified in section 501(c)(3).”160 There are eight permissible exempt 
purposes laid down by section 501(c)(3),161 but the categories 
applicable to charter schools are “educational” and “charitable.” To 
restate the operational test within the context of North Carolina 
charter schools, a charter-holding nonprofit corporation will fail if 
more than an insubstantial part of its activities are in furtherance of 
something other than its charitable and educational purpose.162 
One obvious example of an impermissible activity that would 
violate the operational test would be a charter-holding nonprofit 
organization distributing its net earnings to a small group of private 
individuals.163 This is so because, by definition, a nonprofit 
organization cannot be charitable if it does not serve a broad 
charitable class, and a small group of private individuals is not a 
charitable class.164 
It is important to emphasize that even if an organization has 
many activities that further legitimate exempt purposes, the 
organization will fail the operational test if it serves even a single 
substantial private interest.165 To again illustrate the operational test 
in the context of North Carolina charter schools, if a charter-holding 
nonprofit organization were discovered to be using its resources to 
enrich private individuals rather than serve its educational purpose, it 
would fail the test and forfeit its tax-exempt status. 
 
 160. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2013); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, 
at 317. 
 161. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2013) (listing permissible exempt purposes as religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, fostering national or 
international sports competition, and prevention of cruelty to children or animals). 
 162. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 317. 
 163. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). Other obvious examples would be 501(c)(3) 
organizations that engage in substantial lobbying or any amount of political campaign 
activity because neither of those activities is charitable. 
 164. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii); see also Andrew Megosh et. al, Private Benefit Under 
IRC 501(c)(3), in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2001, at 135, 136–37 (2001), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01.pdf (explaining nonprofits lose exemption “if 
private interests are served other than incidentally”). 
 165. Megosh, supra note 164, at 137; see also Better Bus. Bureau of Washington, D.C., 
Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 282–84 (1945) (ruling that the presence of private 
benefit, if substantial in nature, will preclude 501(c)(3) exemption regardless of an 
organization’s other charitable purposes or activities). 
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b. The Private Benefit Doctrine 
The private benefit doctrine is broader and more demanding 
than the operational test and should be of particular concern to North 
Carolina charter schools, especially those that enter into 
comprehensive management contracts with for-profit companies.166 
Section 501(c)(3) does not explicitly mention the private benefit 
doctrine;167 instead, the doctrine’s origins are in the common law rule 
that a charitable trust must be formed for the benefit of a large and 
indefinite charitable class rather than for specific private individuals168 
and in IRS regulations related to the operational test, discussed 
above, that state that an organization is not operated exclusively for 
exempt purposes “unless it serves a public rather than a private 
interest.”169 From these humble origins the IRS and courts have 
developed a multi-faceted and powerful, if not always predictable and 
consistent, legal doctrine for policing transactions by nonprofits that 
benefit private, noncharitable interests.170 
An illustration of the doctrine’s most venerable and mundane 
application, one that I often use with my Nonprofit Law students, is 
that one cannot obtain charitable tax exemption for purposes of 
raising money for an individual or family afflicted by cancer. 
Although combatting cancer is laudable and fits within any 
reasonable definition of charity, the class of recipients in that case 
would be too narrow and would thus violate the private benefit 
doctrine. 
By the late 1970s, however, the IRS was using the private benefit 
doctrine not only to police the size of organizations’ charitable 
classes, but also to scrutinize whether charitable organizations’ 
 
 166. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1064 (arguing that the IRS “relie[s] heavily on 
the private benefit doctrine to police economic transactions between tax-exempt charities 
and for-profit entities”). 
 167. See id. at 1068; Megosh, supra note 164, at 135. 
 168. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 459; Colombo, supra note 133, at 
1069 (arguing that private benefit traditionally referred to a lack of a sufficiently broad 
charitable class). 
 169. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (providing that 501(c)(3) organizations must 
serve “a public rather than a private interest” and also demonstrate that the organization 
“is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated 
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests”); see also FISHMAN & 
SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 459 (describing the private benefit limitation); Megosh, supra 
note 164, at 135 (explaining that the language of 501(c)(3) limits private benefit). 
 170. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1064 (arguing that the IRS “relie[s] heavily on 
the private benefit doctrine to police economic transactions between tax-exempt charities 
and for-profit entities”). 
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benefits were impermissibly flowing to private individuals outside of 
the charitable class.171 During that era, it was becoming increasingly 
common for charitable nonprofit organizations to enter into 
contractual business arrangements and joint ventures with for-profit 
entities,172 and the IRS deployed the private benefit doctrine to 
ensure that those relationships were not being used, intentionally or 
negligently, to funnel charitable dollars into businesses’ coffers.173 
Despite the IRS’s more frequent and expansive use of private 
benefit, the agency has never clearly defined it.174 The closest it came 
was in 1987 when a General Counsel Memorandum declared that an 
organization does not qualify for 501(c)(3) status: 
[I]f it serves a private interest more than incidentally . . . .  
A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is incidental 
in both a qualitative and a quantitative sense. In order to be 
incidental in a qualitative sense, the benefit must be a necessary 
concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large, 
i.e., the activity can be accomplished only by benefitting certain 
private individuals . . . . To be incidental in a quantitative sense, 
the private benefit must not be substantial after considering the 
overall public benefit conferred by the activity.175 
An example of the IRS’s application of this expanded version of 
private benefit came in the context of its investigation of nonprofit 
credit counseling organizations. The Service found that many such 
organizations “violated the private benefit doctrine because [their] 
operations directly benefitted [for-profit] back-office service 
providers with whom [they] had contractual arrangements to [offer] 
debt consolidation loans, credit repair services, buying clubs, down-
payment assistance,” and various other financial products.176 The IRS 
determined that the credit counseling nonprofits had entered into 
exclusive deals with the for-profit providers, effectively offloading 
 
 171. Id. at 1070. 
 172. See generally Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis 
of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2459–62 (2005) 
(arguing the United States charitable sector began commercializing rapidly during the 
Reagan administration). 
 173. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1071–72 (describing how private benefit became 
the IRS’s primary tool for policing the boundaries between nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations when they entered into joint ventures and partnerships). 
 174. Id. 
 175. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
 176. Colombo, supra note 133, at 1080. 
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most of the actual services and generating significant profits that 
ended up in the for-profits’ bank accounts.177 
Applying the terms of the 1987 General Counsel Memorandum, 
the private benefits flowing to the for-profit organizations were not 
quantitatively incidental because the for-profit firms were reaping 
significant profits.178 Neither were the private benefits qualitatively 
incidental because the charitable organizations could not prove that 
the charitable activity could only be accomplished in ways that 
created the substantial private benefit—in other words, that the 
quantitatively substantial private benefit was unavoidable.179 The IRS 
found no reason to believe that the nonprofit organizations could not 
have provided the same counseling services more efficiently if they 
had managed the programs themselves,180 and, therefore, revoked the 
organizations’ exempt statuses. 
There are crucial differences between the older doctrines 
(private inurement and the traditional version of private benefit) and 
this newer, more expansive version of private benefit. One is that an 
organization such as a nonprofit credit counseling firm—or a charter-
holding nonprofit corporation—might be serving a large enough 
charitable class, but still violating the doctrine because it is also 
substantially benefitting entities or individuals outside the charitable 
class.181 Another is that, unlike private inurement, private benefit 
does not require that payments for goods or services be unreasonable 
or exceed fair market value.182 Finally, unlike private inurement, the 
new private benefit doctrine does not require proof that board 
members are intentionally steering resources away from charitable 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id.; see also Megosh, supra note 164, at 137 (arguing that in determining what 
is quantitatively incidental one also must consider the number of entities benefiting 
because “if all of an organization’s business dealings are with a single entity (or group of 
related entities), or promoter or developer, private benefit is more likely to be present”). 
 179. See Megosh, supra note 164, at 137 (arguing “qualitatively incidental means that 
the private benefit is a mere byproduct of the public benefit”). 
 180. The result in the credit counseling cases can also be articulated in operational test 
terms because the IRS found that the nonprofit organizations had violated the operational 
test’s “primary purpose” requirement: the nonprofit organizations were no longer 
primarily pursuing charitable ends and no longer primarily undertaking charitable 
activities because they had become more concerned with serving the private interests of 
the for-profit “back-office” providers than providing services to those in need. See 
Colombo, supra note 133, at 1080; see also supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text 
(discussing the operational test). In essence, the organizations had become “for-profit[s] in 
disguise.” Colombo, supra note 133, at 1082. 
 181. Megosh, supra note 164, at 136–37. 
 182. See id. at 138 (citing Est of Hawaii v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 1067 (1979)). 
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activities,183 or that the charity is being used as a front by a for-profit 
company to procure resources184 (though both of those instances 
would furnish strong proof of private benefit). To find a private 
benefit violation, it suffices to show that the directors of the charity 
are negligently failing to conserve charitable assets by entering into 
transactions, even arms-length transactions, that cause an unnecessary 
outflow of assets to noncharitable interests.185 The IRS will be more 
likely to find such negligent diversion of charitable assets where a 
charity fails to follow normal business practices by, for example, 
relying too heavily on a single vendor for the goods and services it 
needs, or failing to compare prices before making significant 
purchases.186 
To summarize, nonprofit charter-holding corporations are 
subject to various state and federal nonprofit laws. At the state level, 
the charter-holders—their boards of directors in particular—should 
be concerned about violating the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience. Overall enforcement of state nonprofit law is lax in North 
Carolina, but directors are more likely to be prosecuted for duty-of-
loyalty violations than for violations of the duty of care or obedience. 
The federal government’s enforcement of nonprofit law is more 
robust than North Carolina’s, and charter-holding corporations 
should be concerned about the application of the private inurement 
doctrine, the intermediate sanctions regime, the operational test, and 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1097 (arguing that in some instances of private 
benefit enforcement, the IRS appears concerned that the charitable organization is being 
used as a front to funnel charitable assets to for-profit businesses in order to increase their 
market share and enhance their profits). 
 185. See id.; Megosh, supra note 164, at 138. 
 186. Megosh, supra note 164, at 140. One example of private benefit being applied to a 
charity’s arms-length transaction is revealed by Judge Richard Posner’s pithy opinion in 
the case of United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). There, a 
nonprofit board of directors negotiated a contract for fundraising services with a for-profit 
firm. Id. at 1175. The terms of the contract were overwhelmingly favorable to the for-
profit, allowing it to raise millions of dollars in revenues, much of which went into its own 
pockets. Id. at 1175–76. Judge Posner rejected (incorrectly, in my view) the IRS’s claim 
that the fundraising firm’s contract gave it so much power that it had become an insider to 
the charity and thus liable for private inurement. Id. at 1176. However, in a puckish bit of 
dictum in the opinion’s closing paragraphs, he gave strong reason to believe that the IRS 
would have prevailed if it had brought its claim under the private benefit doctrine. Id. at 
1179. He implicitly endorsed the notion that impermissible private benefit could occur in 
cases where managers of nonprofit organizations unwisely entered into economically 
inefficient business transactions with for-profit firms. Id. Stated otherwise, nonprofits that 
fail to responsibly conserve their charitable assets by paying too much to for-profit firms 
may in extreme circumstances violate the private benefit doctrine and thereby be subject 
to loss of exemption. Id. at 1179–80. 
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the private benefit doctrine. As the following discussion will illustrate, 
nonprofit charter-holders are at particular risk under those state and 
federal doctrines where they enter into comprehensive management 
contracts with for-profit companies. 
III.  AN EXAMINATION OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARTER SCHOOLS’ 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND NONPROFIT LAW COMPLIANCE 
This Section divides my sample of North Carolina charter 
schools into three roughly hewn categories. The first comprises 
schools for which there is strong indication of noncompliance with 
state and federal nonprofit law. Legal authorities should investigate 
these schools’ operations aggressively. A second category of charter 
schools is operating in the gray areas that abound in nonprofit law as 
a result of its many “facts and circumstances” and “all the factors” 
tests.187 These schools approach, and in some cases appear to cross 
over, the lines of acceptable nonprofit behavior. State and federal 
regulators should examine these schools’ practices with care, paying 
particular attention to their possible noncompliance with the federal 
private benefit doctrine and state law duties of obedience and care. A 
third group of schools in my sample appears generally to be 
complying with nonprofit law. They operate with a reasonable degree 
of transparency and regularly take steps to ensure that the public 
funds entrusted to them are spent efficiently on the provision of 
charitable and educational services. 
The following sections consider each of these categories in turn, 
beginning with a discussion of arguably noncompliant schools and 
ending with a brief description of several that appear to be doing 
things correctly. As attentive readers will ascertain, most of the 
dubious nonprofit behavior takes place among charter schools 
managed by for-profit companies. 
A. First Category: Schools that Appear to Violate State and Federal 
Nonprofit Law 
Three of the schools in my sample show distressing signs of 
noncompliance with nonprofit law: Charter Day School (“CDS”), 
Columbus Charter School, and Douglass Academy. It should not be 
surprising that operations at these three schools are similar, and 
 
 187. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (arguing the private benefit doctrine 
has vague standards); see also Kelley, supra note 172, at 2476–82 (criticizing the IRS for 
using an unpredictable “all the factors” test in connection with the commerciality 
doctrine). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015) 
2015] CHARTER SCHOOLS & NONPROFIT LAW 1791 
similarly troubling, because they are formally governed by a single 
nonprofit board of directors of CDS, which in turn is comprehensively 
managed by a single for-profit company, Roger Bacon Academy 
(“RBA”).188 
1.  Description of RBA’s Financial and Management Practices 
Obtaining detailed information on RBA-managed charter 
schools proved challenging. Unlike other EMO-managed schools in 
my sample, all of which responded to my public records requests 
within a reasonable period of time by furnishing electronic copies of 
board minutes, board packets, financial reports, and vendor contracts, 
the RBA-managed schools gave me nothing. As I later discovered, 
RBA’s reluctance to share information fits a pattern; it has resisted 
similar records requests from news organizations and, as a result, has 
been embroiled in related lawsuits.189 
In spite of the reticence of the RBA-managed schools to divulge 
details of their finances and operations, I was able to form an opinion 
regarding their nonprofit legal compliance by examining the schools’ 
websites, IRS Forms 990 (at least those that were publicly available 
on Guidestar.com), and the charter applications filed by the more 
recently established schools.190 I also benefitted from the fact that 
StarNews, a newspaper that covers southeastern North Carolina, the 
region in which RBA charter schools are clustered, made its own 
public records requests and obtained access to at least some 
documents.191 Based on RBA’s limited response to StarNews’ 
requests, and on the paper’s own investigative reporting, it published 
a series of articles that revealed much about RBA and the schools 
 
 188. RBA also manages South Brunswick Charter School. I did not examine that 
school’s records in detail because it did not begin operating until summer 2014, which is 
when I began researching this Article. 
 189. Dineen, supra note 26; see also Gareth McGrath, StarNews Drops Charter School 
Lawsuit in New Hanover, but Will Refile in Brunswick, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington 
Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20141209/ARTICLES/141209723/0
/search?p=3&tc=pg (discussing a lawsuit in response to CDS’s failure to respond to 
records requests); F.T. Norton, Charter Day School Gets More Time to Respond to 
StarNews Lawsuit, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Oct. 15, 2014), http://
www.starnewsonline.com/article/20141015/ARTICLES/141019815/0/search (discussing the 
grant of an extension to CDS for the records request). 
 190. The North Carolina Office of Charter Schools now posts on its website electronic 
versions of aspiring schools’ charter applications. However, the earliest such applications are 
from 2012. See Charter Applications, PUB. SCH. OF N.C., http://www.ncpublicschools.org
/charterschools/applications/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2015). 
 191. Dineen, supra note 26. 
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that it manages.192 My analysis relies in part on the information 
revealed in those articles. 
RBA was founded and is owned by a controversial, outspoken 
individual named Baker Mitchell,193 who moved to North Carolina in 
the mid-1990s with the express purpose of taking advantage of the 
state’s new charter school legislation.194 Mitchell also owns a for-profit 
property leasing company, Coastal Habitat Conservancy, whose 
primary activity is leasing real property and equipment to charter 
schools.195 
From the time of CDS’s establishment as a nonprofit corporation 
in 1999 until 2013, Mitchell served as a voting member of its board of 
directors.196 In 2013, the North Carolina Office of Charter Schools 
told him that it would not approve additional charters for CDS unless 
he relinquished his position.197 Although Mitchell resigned, or in his 
words, “[took] a leave of absence”198 from his position as voting 
director, he retained his position as board secretary, which means that 
he is and always has been in charge of producing and maintaining all 
of CDS’s corporate paperwork including board meeting minutes.199 
Mark Dudeck, who is the chief financial officer of Mitchell’s for-profit 
companies,200 joined Mitchell on CDS’s board, serving as its treasurer 
and registered agent.201 
According to an investigative report that analyzed some of 
CDS’s board meeting minutes, Mitchell typically did not formally 
vote on matters in which he and his companies had an interest, but he 
often participated in and even directed the discussions that led up to 
the votes.202 Even after his resignation from the board, he reportedly 
 
 192. See, e.g., Caitlin Dineen & Pressley Baird, Bacon Academy Management 
Company Earns Millions from Schools, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington June 29, 2014), 
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20140629/ARTICLES/140629683/0/search. 
 193. See Gareth McGrath, Charter Day School Inc. Maintains Contentious Posture on 
Oversight, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.starnewsonline.com
/article/20141021/ARTICLES/141029943/0/search. 
 194. See Wang I, supra note 64. 
 195. See McGrath, supra note 193. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Wang I, supra note 64 (arguing Mitchell resigned from the board after state 
officials told him CDS would not receive approval for an additional charter school unless 
he did so). 
 198. See McGrath, supra note 193. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.; see also Wang I, supra note 64 (arguing CDS board members were frustrated 
by Mitchell’s continuing involvement in CDS governance). An interested director can end 
meetings in which interested transactions are discussed without violating any law or 
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continues to take an active role in corporate governance and, in his 
ongoing role as secretary, produces the written records of those 
discussions.203 
Over the years, RBA helped establish additional charter schools 
in North Carolina, but rather than forming new boards of directors 
for each of the new schools, it consolidated governance control by 
having the existing CDS corporation apply for the new charters. This 
means that the small governing board204 that once oversaw only CDS 
now has oversight responsibility over all RBA-managed schools.205 It 
also means, of course, that the two interested directors, Mitchell and 
Dudeck, who served for many years on the CDS board, exercised 
influence over all of the schools. 
Together, the RBA-managed charter schools receive enormous 
amounts of public money. Although Mitchell has fought to keep most 
of the financial details secret,206 an investigative report that examined 
his first two schools’ audited financial statements determined that 
together they collected almost $20 million over a six-year period 
ending in 2013.207 During the 2013–2014 school year alone, three 
RBA-managed schools—CDS, Columbus Charter School, and 
Douglass Academy—collectively received more than $13 million in 
total revenues.208 
It is impossible to know precisely how much Mitchell and his 
companies are taking home in profits,209 but it is fair to surmise the 
returns are generous. The management contract between RBA and 
each of the schools declares that RBA is entitled to a fee of sixteen 
percent of total revenues, plus additional incentive payments based 
on student achievement.210 So, for example, during the 2013–2014 
 
breaching a fiduciary duty. It is only when an interested director exercises control or 
intimidation over the vote that a violation could result.  
 203. See McGrath, supra note 193. 
 204. See Board of Trustees, CHARTER DAY SCH., http://charterdayschool.net/leadership/
board-of-trustees/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2015) (listing five members of the board of 
directors). 
 205. See id. (listing four charter schools governed by the CDS board of directors). 
 206. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 207. Wang I, supra note 64. 
 208. Dineen & Baird, supra note 192. 
 209. Wang I, supra note 64. 
 210. See Educational Service Provider Agreement Between Roger Bacon Academy 
and Douglass Academy §§ 6.03, 6.10 [hereinafter Douglass-Bacon Agreement], 
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/resources/application/2014apps
/douglassacademy.pdf (naming RBA’s management fee as sixteen percent of total revenue 
and providing for performance-based incentive payments); Dineen & Baird, supra note 
192. 
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school year, two of the schools paid RBA almost $2.4 million in fees 
and incentives out of just under $13 million in total revenue.211 
However, focusing exclusively on management fees significantly 
understates the amount of money flowing through CDS and into 
RBA’s coffers. Lease payments for real estate are a large source of 
RBA’s revenue. During the 2013–2014 school year, for example, CDS 
and Columbus Charter School paid Coastal Habitat Conservancy, an 
RBA-affiliate controlled by Mitchell, approximately $1.5 million to 
rent their facilities, plus nearly $549,000 for maintenance.212 
In addition to leasing its real estate from a Mitchell-controlled 
company, the schools rent or buy practically everything else they need 
from either RBA or Coastal Habitat Conservancy: books, furniture, 
desks, computers, teacher training, and sports equipment.213 To focus 
on one sample, CDS’s 2010 Form 990 reported the details of business 
transactions it entered into with “interested persons,”214 and said that 
it engaged in six such payments, including a $1.6 million management 
fee, $550,000 for “staff development and supervision,” $170,000 for 
“back office support,” $965,000 for “building rent – classrooms,” 
$83,000 for “building rent – admin offices,” and $318,000 for “misc. 
equipment rental.”215 Based on this evidence, CDS paid insiders 
(presumably the companies controlled by Mitchell) at least $3,686,000 
in a single year. CDS’s 2011 Form 990 shows payments to interested 
parties rising to $4,137,000.216 Best of all, at least from the perspective 
of RBA and Coastal Conservancy, these insiders never have to wait 
for their money. Under Article VI of the management agreement 
between CDS and RBA, CDS is obligated to establish a joint bank 
account and deposit all revenues within three days of receipt.217 RBA 
 
 211. Dineen & Baird, supra note 192 (noting also that the third RBA-managed 
school’s management fee was waived amidst a state investigation into low enrollment). 
 212. Id. 
 213. McGrath, supra note 193; see also Caitlin Dineen, Baker Mitchell Companies 
Benefit Directly from Charter Day Nonprofit He Started, STARNEWS ONLINE 
(Wilmington June 29, 2014), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20140629/ARTICLES
/140629682 (“[D]ocuments provided by the Charter Day School Inc. shows [sic] that the 
nonprofit group owns very little, if any, of the land, buildings, furniture or equipment used 
by its three schools. Instead, the schools rent most of their material goods from founder 
Baker Mitchell’s two for-profit companies—Roger Bacon Academy and Coastal Habitat 
Conservancy.”); Dineen & Baird, supra note 192 (same). 
 214. See Charter Day Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from 
Income Tax pt. IV (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2010).  
 215. Id. 
 216. Charter Day Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax pt. IV (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2011). 
 217. See Douglass-Bacon Agreement, supra note 210, § 6.01. 
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can draw from that account whenever it desires to pay itself or its 
affiliates, and in whatever amount it wishes. 
It is significant that nothing in CDS’s corporate minutes indicates 
that the goods and services that Mitchell’s for-profit companies sold 
or leased to CDS were subject to any competitive bidding, 
comparative shopping, or price negotiation.218 A passage from CDS’s 
2010 Form 990 is particularly revealing in this regard.219 In response to 
a question about whether CDS had engaged in any EBTs (meaning 
they had paid too much for a good or service provided by a DQP)220 
during the previous fiscal year, CDS responded that it had not, and 
that “the LLC consistently compares prices against the rent paid to 
Coastal Habitat Conservancy.”221 In other words, the response 
indicated that CDS’s governing board was not verifying that the 
prices being charged were fair, but “the LLC”—meaning RBA—
was.222 The upshot is that, with seemingly little inquiry or input from 
the charter schools’ independent directors, representatives of the for-
profit management company decided what was reasonable to charge 
for the services they provided. 
2.  The Application of Nonprofit Legal Doctrines to RBA-Managed 
Schools 
a. Private Inurement and Intermediate Sanctions 
Although the devil is in the details—details that RBA appears 
determined not to reveal—evidence exists to indicate private 
inurement violations arising out of the management of the three 
schools governed by the CDS board of directors. There can be no 
doubt that at least two insiders to the CDS board of directors—Baker 
Mitchell and Mark Dudeck223—have been on both sides of numerous, 
 
 218. See Wang I, supra note 64. 
 219. Charter Day Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax pt. III (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2010). 
 220. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 221. Charter Day Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax pt. V (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2010). 
 222. See Dineen, supra note 213 (reporting that in CDS’s early years, Mitchell signed 
most bid documents on behalf of Coastal Habitat and RBA and an illegible signature 
signed for the school; after Dudeck joined the RBA about seven years ago, he began 
signing the documents); see also Wang I, supra note 64 (arguing that when CDS was first 
trying to obtain federal tax exempt status, it furnished the IRS with assurances that its 
facility lease was evaluated for fairness by an independent real estate professional when in 
fact that professional worked for the same real estate firm as the board chair’s husband). 
 223. One could argue that RBA itself has become an insider to CDS as a result of its 
comprehensive control over all aspects of CDS’s operations and finances. In accordance 
with this argument, payments from CDS to RBA and its affiliates would be considered 
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substantial financial transactions that amount to many millions of 
dollars.224 
It is possible, of course, that all of the charitable dollars paid by 
CDS to Mitchell’s for-profit companies were properly vetted by the 
CDS board of directors with no influence by Mitchell or Dudeck, and 
it is possible that all of those transactions were in fact fair, even 
beneficial, to CDS.225 It is also possible that disinterested CDS 
directors maintained careful records of their factual investigations 
and deliberations concerning potential conflict of interest transactions 
involving Mitchell and Dudeck, and that they simply do not wish to 
share those records in spite of their legal obligation to do so.226 
But evidence indicates otherwise. Mitchell is reported to have 
participated in and even led board discussions that ultimately 
approved these self-interested arrangements.227 There is nothing to 
indicate that disinterested directors at CDS took action to verify that 
the organization was getting a fair deal for the goods and services 
being provided by insiders Mitchell and Dudeck. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to suspect that Mitchell and Dudeck were doing exactly 
what the private inurement doctrine forbids: using their influence to 
steer excessive economic benefits to themselves, or, in slightly more 
vernacular terms, lining their own pockets with charitable dollars.228 
The IRS is unlikely to pursue CDS for private inurement because 
the only possible punishment is loss of exempt status,229 which would 
unfairly harm the children that attend the school and the community 
that surrounds it. Instead, intermediate sanctions are a more probable 
avenue of inquiry. 
 
insider transactions and subject to private inurement scrutiny. A similar argument was 
rejected by Judge Posner in United Cancer Council v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th 
Cir. 1999), but I believe Judge Posner’s private inurement analysis in that case was flawed. 
Because the IRS’s newer intermediate sanctions laws leave little doubt that RBA could 
qualify as a DQP, it is unlikely that the IRS or anyone else will challenge RBA (or Judge 
Posner’s decision) by pursuing this theory. 
 224. See supra notes 196–216 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra Section II.A.2, II.B.1.a (discussing the requirements of the state law 
duty of loyalty and federal private inurement requirements). 
 226. See supra Section II.B.1.a (discussing federal private inurement requirements). 
 227. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra Section II.B.1.a. Even if CDS could produce board meeting minutes 
purporting to show that the insider transactions were properly investigated and approved 
by disinterested directors, a thorough investigator would treat such records with at least 
some skepticism given that Mitchell himself acts as the board’s secretary and thus 
presumably has a large hand in creating the organization’s paper trail. 
 229. See supra Section II.B.1.a. 
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Mitchell and Dudeck, the affiliated for-profit companies with 
which they are associated, and the directors and other principals of 
CDS, should be concerned about the IRS’s intermediate sanctions 
rules because violation can lead to cripplingly large financial 
penalties, particularly in instances such as this one where millions of 
dollars are flowing through a charitable organization and ending up in 
the pockets of DQPs.230 Based on Mitchell’s long-term position on 
CDS’s board of directors, his years of holding the office of corporate 
secretary, and indications that he takes an active role in guiding and 
governing the organization, there is little doubt that he qualifies as a 
DQP for intermediate sanctions purposes. Because the status of DQP 
does not depend on formal titles, it would make no difference for 
intermediate sanctions purposes that Mitchell recently resigned as a 
voting director,231 especially since evidence indicates that he retains 
not only his officer position but also his influence over the 
organization.232 Dudeck, who within the statute’s five-year look-back 
period also has served as a voting board member and treasurer of 
CDS, would also almost certainly qualify as a DQP. Finally, assuming 
Mitchell controls more than thirty-five percent of RBA and Coastal 
Habitat Conservancy, they too would be considered DQPs.233 
The remaining question would be whether any or all of the 
transactions entered into between CDS and the for-profit companies 
constituted EBTs. CDS’s board of directors can shift the burden of 
proving the existence of an EBT to the IRS if CDS’s disinterested 
board members engaged in statutorily required comparison-shopping 
to determine whether CDS received value for the charitable dollars it 
turned over to DQPs.234 However, nothing on the available record 
indicates that such vigorous comparison-shopping took place. 
If the IRS determines that CDS has overpaid for any or all of the 
services it has received from RBA, Coastal Habitat Conservancy, and 
any other affiliated for-profit companies, the financial consequences 
could be severe. Many millions of public, charitable dollars have 
flowed through CDS during the previous five years.235 If some of 
those millions constituted excess benefit payments, the IRS could 
compel the DQPs—the individuals, the companies, or both—to pay 
 
 230. See supra Section II.B.1.b (describing DQP); see also supra notes 210–16 and 
accompanying text (describing the dollar volumes flowing through CDS). 
 231. See supra Section II.B.1.b (noting that DQP status does not depend on formal 
titles). 
 232. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 234. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 235. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text. 
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back the overcharges plus a fine calculated as twenty-five percent of 
the excess benefits.236 If the remaining, disinterested directors are 
shown to have knowingly, willingly, and unreasonably permitted 
those transactions to take place, they too could be fined up to a 
maximum of $20,000.237 
b. State Law Fiduciary Duties 
Although the leaders of CDS and the for-profit companies that 
animate it should be most concerned about the application of federal 
law, their actions could also be subject to sanction under North 
Carolina law. If, for example, Mitchell and Dudeck have used their 
influence over the CDS board of directors to steer excessive 
charitable and public dollars to their for-profit companies and, 
indirectly, to themselves, they obviously would be in violation of their 
fiduciary duty of loyalty.238 If the disinterested directors on CDS’s 
board failed to investigate and, where warranted, challenge the 
insider transactions carried out by Mitchell and Dudeck, they 
arguably would be in violation of their fiduciary duty of care.239 
Finally, if indeed charitable dollars intended for CDS’s educational 
mission were impermissibly diverted into the coffers of RBA and its 
affiliates and converted into profits for its principals, all of the board 
members would be in violation of their fiduciary duty of obedience.240 
Mitchell clearly does not like probing questions or criticism,241 
and he is not shy about justifying his actions, particularly when others 
have accused him, his associates, and the institutions he controls of 
impermissible behavior. In response to allegations that he was 
engaged in conflicts of interest, his response was “[u]ndue influence, 
blah blah blah.”242 He apparently was not aware that, as a director of 
a nonprofit corporation, he was subject to legal duties under federal 
and state law to be scrupulously attentive to conflicts of interest. 
Mitchell further argues that there is nothing impermissible about 
reaping significant corporate profits from charter school 
 
 236. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 237. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 238. See supra Section II.A.2. 
 239. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 240. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 241. See Gareth McGrath, Baker Mitchell Sues Pruden over Criticism of Charter 
Schools, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.starnewsonline.com
/article/20150109/ARTICLES/150109714/0/search (reporting on a lawsuit he filed against a 
critic); supra note 189 and accompanying text (describing Mitchell’s reluctance to comply 
with requests for information). 
 242. Wang I, supra note 64. 
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management. To Mitchell, his schools are simply an example of the 
triumph of the free market. He has been quoted as stating derisively 
that “[p]eople here think it’s unholy if you make a profit” from 
schools.243 “In a free-market capitalistic society, the quality of results 
determines success or failure and ensures efficiency in the delivery of 
goods and services.”244 Referring to himself in the third person, he has 
said “[m]aybe Baker Mitchell gets a huge profit. Maybe he doesn’t 
get any profit. Who cares?”245 
Once again, if Mitchell had been briefed by his attorneys on the 
basics of nonprofit law, he would realize that several different 
doctrines, most notably and obviously in his case the federal 
intermediate sanctions doctrine, the federal private inurement 
doctrine, and North Carolina fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
obedience, place upon him and his fellow directors a legal obligation 
to care how big his companies’ profits are.246 
As a corollary to the argument that no one should care about his 
and his companies’ profits, Mitchell has argued that all that matters is 
that RBA is providing quality education to the students who attend 
the schools it manages.247 The proof is in the pudding, he claims, 
because his students typically perform better on standardized tests 
than students at nearby traditional public schools.248 This argument 
again ignores the fact that he and his colleagues on the nonprofit 
board are subject to legal obligations to take into account not just the 
charitable and educational outcomes, but whether those outcomes are 
being achieved without wasting charitable public dollars.249 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. McGrath, supra note 193. 
 245. Wang I, supra note 64. 
 246. Mitchell’s attitude betrays a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of 
the nonprofit sector. As I often tell my Nonprofit Law students, “We the People,” 
meaning the tax-paying members of the public, are silent third parties in transactions 
between charitable and for-profit organizations. Most citizens who pay taxes, and who 
through the tax code subsidize the activities of charitable organizations such as CDS, have 
little or no opportunity to evaluate whether our money is being spent wisely and 
efficiently. That is why we entrust legal authorities, namely the IRS and states’ attorneys 
general, to monitor those transactions and look out for our interests. 
 247. McGrath, supra note 193. 
 248. See Wang I, supra note 64. 
 249. See supra Section II.A.3 (describing the duty of obedience). In addition, although 
it is for the most part legally beside the point—nonprofit directors simply cannot waive 
away concerns about private inurement and related legal doctrines by pointing to positive 
outcomes—it bears mentioning that Mitchell arguably overstates the quality of his schools’ 
educational achievements. Critics allege that Mitchell’s schools engage in the cream 
skimming described in Part I of this Article, meaning they enroll comparatively low 
percentages of needy students whose standardized test scores tend to be lower. See Wang 
I, supra note 64. To take one example, in 2014, thirty-seven percent of test takers at the 
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Finally, Mitchell has responded to allegations of his and his 
companies’ self-serving behavior by claiming that the companies are 
responsive to and firmly under the control of the charter schools and 
their board. As he is fond of saying, “parents can shut us down 
overnight. They stop bringing their kids here? We don’t get any 
money.”250 This assertion, while technically true, ignores the reality of 
the comprehensive contractual relationship between the nonprofit 
schools and the for-profit management companies. 
In fact, to fire RBA would be to commit institutional suicide. 
Under the terms of the contract that the RBA-managed schools have 
signed, all of the millions of dollars in public funds that flow to the 
schools are made almost immediately available to the management 
company, which has the power to spend those funds in any way it 
chooses so long as it provides the promised educational services. 
Instead of using those funds to purchase goods on behalf of the 
school—land, buildings, furniture, computer equipment, books, and 
everything else that goes into educating children—RBA takes the 
money and, on behalf of the school, rents or leases to the school all of 
those necessary inputs.251 From whom does it lease the goods and 
services? From RBA and its for-profit affiliates, of course!252 
This means that if the board of directors grew dissatisfied, either 
with the quality of RBA’s services or with the extent of its profit-
taking, and decided to discontinue the relationship, they would be left 
with absolutely nothing: no teachers, no curriculum, no school 
building, no land, no books, no sports equipment, nothing.253 To 
illustrate the aftermath of firing RBA, one can visualize the scene in 
the 1960s television program, Dr. Seuss’ How The Grinch Stole 
Christmas, when the Grinch stuffs the Christmas tree up the chimney 
at Cindy Lou Who’s house and steals away into the night. All he 
 
RBA-managed Columbus Charter School were “economically disadvantaged,” compared 
to the county’s seventy-four percent. Id. This low percentage of economically 
disadvantaged students is at least arguably by design, since Columbus Charter School does 
not provide transportation or a federally supported free and reduced-price lunch program 
for its students—both of which are necessary if a school is to attract lower-income 
students. Id. 
 250. Wang I, supra note 64. 
 251. See id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Jennifer Dixon, Public Money for Schools Buys Private Property, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2014/12/14
/charters-national-heritage-academies-tax-dollars-school-contents/20357559/ (arguing that 
a for-profit management company’s ownership of both the school building and its contents 
means charter school boards have “little leverage to remove the company if they are 
unhappy with [its] stewardship”). 
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leaves behind is a “crumb that was even too small for a mouse.”254 
The schools governed by CDS would find themselves similarly 
stripped if they were to challenge or fire RBA, which renders 
doubtful Mitchell’s claim that they are capable of independent 
oversight.255 
To conclude the discussion of North Carolina charter schools 
whose practices are of doubtful rectitude when examined through the 
lens of nonprofit law, it should be emphasized that RBA-managed 
schools are not the only ones with compliance problems. To take one 
example, recent news reports indicate that an independent charter 
school in Kinston, North Carolina had its charter suspended for 
grossly negligent financial practices that led to insolvency.256 In a 
similar vein, I recently heard an anecdote from a reporter who asked 
a rural North Carolina independent charter school for copies of its 
recent Forms 990. School officials responded that the Office of 
Charter Schools took care of all the paper work for them. Obviously, 
they were not well informed about their duties under nonprofit law. 
Thus, although the RBA-managed charter schools are not alone 
in their dubious nonprofit law compliance, they are the only ones in 
my sample. Charity regulators, particularly the IRS, should bring 
their investigative power to bear to determine if in fact the law is 
being broken. 
B. Second Category: North Carolina Charter Schools Operating in 
Nonprofit Law’s Gray Areas 
Two clusters of North Carolina charter schools fall into this 
second category, and each cluster is managed by a for-profit EMO. 
National Heritage Academies, headquartered in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, manages charter schools across the United States.257 I 
examined five NHA schools located in North Carolina, including 
 
 254. How the Grinch Stole Christmas! (TV Movie 1966)—Quotes, IMDB, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0060345/quotes (last visited Aug. 16, 2015). 
 255. See Marion Wang, When Charter Schools Are Nonprofit in Name Only, PRO 
PUBLICA (Dec. 9, 2014, 11:49 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/when-charter-
schools-are-nonprofit-in-name-only [hereinafter Wang II] (arguing similarly situated 
schools in Ohio fired and sued their for-profit management firm but had difficulty 
continuing because they had turned over most of their assets to the for-profits and had 
little left with which to relaunch the schools). 
 256. See Lynn Bonner, NC Audit Finds Financial Mismanagement at Closed Charter 
School: Ex-CEO Disputes Findings, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/2015/01/28/4512207/audit-finds-financialmismanagement. 
html (reporting on alleged mismanagement of a North Carolina charter school). 
 257. See School Directory, NAT’L HERITAGE ACAD., https://www.nhaschools.com/en
/Our-Schools/Pages/School-Directory.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2015). 
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Forsyth Academy, Greensboro Academy, PreEminent Charter 
Academy, Queens Grant Community School, and Research Triangle 
Academy. The second for-profit company, Charter Schools USA 
(“CSUSA”), is located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida and manages 
schools in seven different states.258 I examined three CSUSA schools 
in North Carolina, including Cabarrus Charter Academy, Cardinal 
Charter Academy, and Langtree Charter Academy. The following 
discussion, which is based on my review of thousands of pages of 
documents that each company supplied in response to my public 
records requests,259 analyzes the school clusters separately since their 
management practices differ from one another. However, because the 
management practices of the schools within each cluster are 
practically identical, the analysis for the most part treats each cluster 
as a single unit. I begin with the NHA cluster of schools. 
1.  Description of Financial and Management Practices of Schools 
Managed by National Heritage Academies and Charter Schools USA 
The most noteworthy aspect of the relationship between NHA 
and its North Carolina charter schools is that it is governed by what 
the industry calls “sweeps” contracts.260 The term “sweeps” refers to 
the fact that practically every dollar that comes from public sources 
into the nonprofit charter-holding corporations is instantaneously 
swept out of their bank accounts and deposited into NHA’s.261 In 
exchange, NHA undertakes to provide the nonprofit charter-holder 
with everything necessary to start and run a successful charter school: 
curricula, teachers, teacher training, real estate,262 furniture, 
 
 258. See Our Schools, CHARTER SCH. USA, http://charterschoolsusa.com/our-schools/ 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2015). 
 259. See supra Introduction, Section C. 
 260. See Wang II, supra note 255 (employing and explaining the term sweeps contract). 
 261. See Management Agreement Between National Heritage Academies., Inc. and 
Greensboro Academy art. V.A (May 18, 1999) [hereinafter Greensboro Acad. Mgmt. 
Agreement] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Wang II, supra note 255. 
 262. See Greensboro Acad. Mgmt. Agreement, supra note 261, at art. III, IV. In 
addition to the management contract, NHA enters into lease agreements with each of the 
schools for the provision of its facilities. See Lease Agreement Between National Heritage 
Academies. and Greensboro Academy, at Recitals (Oct. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Greensboro 
Acad. Lease Agreement] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Technically, they 
are subleases because NHA leases the facilities from its own property development 
affiliate, Charter Development Company, LLC, and then subleases the property to the 
school. Id. The lease terms make clear that if the school loses its charter or for any reason 
terminates its relationship with NHA, the management company takes back the building 
along with everything in it. Id. at art. 13. The tenant—meaning the charter school 
nonprofit—pays all upkeep, utilities, taxes, and insurance. Id. at art. 5–7. This is 
conceptually confusing, since in fact NHA takes all of the school’s revenue before the 
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equipment, administrative support, accounting and financial services, 
etc.263 Notably, practically everything leased or purchased under the 
contract remains the property of NHA in case the contract is 
terminated.264 Once NHA provides the promised goods and services, 
it retains all leftover money as its management fee.265 Another 
contract provision, one that at first blush appears innocuous, 
acknowledges that NHA manages multiple charter schools, that there 
are certain NHA administrative services that cannot easily be 
attributed to a single school, and that NHA retains the right to 
attribute these expenses to the various schools on whatever 
reasonable basis it decides.266 
The contract provides the charter-holding nonprofit organization 
the right to hire an independent consulting firm to evaluate NHA’s 
services, but any such consultation must be paid for out of board 
discretionary funds.267 Given that the boards’ discretionary funds 
amount to no more than $35,000 per year268 (out of a typical annual 
budget of anywhere between $4 million and $6 million),269 and that, 
based on my review of meeting minutes, the boards usually spend all 
of those funds on sports coaches and equipment, after-school 
enrichment programs, conference travel, teacher recognition, karaoke 
machines, furniture for the parent lounge, and countless other 
purposes, the right to hire an outside consultant seems mostly 
 
school gets its hands on it, and pays itself for rent and upkeep. Id. at art. 3. Under 
Paragraph 3.5 of the lease, the nonprofit also agrees that if NHA makes capital 
improvements to the property, it may raise the rent to compensate itself. Id. at art. 3, para. 
5. In sum, under the terms of the lease there is virtually no way for NHA to lose. It takes 
the organization’s money, pays itself whatever it wants in rent, and reimburses itself for 
any and all real-estate-related expenses. Id. 
 263. Wang II, supra note 255. 
 264. Greensboro Acad. Mgmt. Agreement, supra note 261, at art. VII.B.2. However, 
under the agreement, “[a]ssets owned by the Academy shall remain the property of the 
Academy.” Id. 
 265. See id. at art. V.C. 
 266. Id. at art. V.E. 
 267. Id. at art. IV.F. 
 268. See National Heritage Academies Draft Services Agreement art. VII.D (Apr. 13, 
2012) [hereinafter NHA Draft Services Agreement], available at http://www
.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/resources/application/2014apps/summerfield.pdf 
(depicting a model management agreement submitted as part of NHA’s charter 
application to the North Carolina Office of Charter Schools for Summerfield Charter 
Academy). Additionally, under the agreement, the board’s discretionary account is 
defined as $35,000 or two percent of per-pupil allocations. Id. 
 269. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 14, 2006) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (projecting an annual budget of $4.4 million); 
Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Feb. 11, 2014) (on file with the 
North Carolina Law Review) (projecting an annual budget of approximately $5.5 million). 
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theoretical. In my review of thousands of pages of board documents, I 
never saw evidence that any board member considered bringing in an 
outside expert or otherwise engaging in any form of neutral 
evaluation or comparative shopping. 
Either party may terminate the management contract upon 
ninety days’ notice.270 However, as was true with the RBA-managed 
schools, the contract’s “Grinch” provision ensures that the nonprofit 
organizations would commit institutional suicide if they were to 
exercise the termination right since practically all school-related 
property would remain with NHA.271 
The management contract between NHA and its charters 
requires NHA to keep the schools’ boards of directors reasonably 
informed of the school’s operations so that the boards can provide 
oversight.272 In many respects, NHA appears to honor this 
commitment. Based on my review of years’ worth of board minutes at 
different NHA-managed schools, most board meetings include a 
Principal’s Report in which the school principal, who invariably is an 
NHA employee, provides directors an overview of important 
developments since the previous meeting.273 NHA also regularly 
provides copies of school-related policies and procedures and seeks 
directors’ approval. In recent years, the company has involved the 
directors in personnel decisions by furnishing applicants’ resumes and 
employment questionnaires and seeking directors’ approval. Also in 
recent years, NHA has created an online School Performance 
Dashboard Suite that gives directors access to current statistics about 
school enrollment, school achievement, and parent satisfaction, 
among other metrics.274 Most board meetings also include discussions 
and votes related to the expenditure of the board’s discretionary 
funds.275 Significantly, some meeting minutes record the presence of a 
 
 270. NHA Draft Servs. Agreement, supra note 268, at art. II.B.3. 
 271. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 272. See, e.g., Greensboro Acad. Mgmt. Agreement, supra note 261, at art. III.A, V.F 
(requiring NHA to remain generally accountable to the board and to furnish the board 
with regular financial reports). 
 273. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 14, 2014) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (including a Principal’s Report and a School 
Performance Report). 
 274. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. Of Dirs. (Aug. 13, 2013) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (referring to the School Performance 
Dashboard Suite). 
 275. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Apr. 5, 2001) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board funds for 
purchase of a kiln); Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Feb. 3, 2000) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board discretionary 
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lawyer, who presumably would be available to answer questions if the 
board members had any.276 
At first blush, NHA also appears to furnish each school’s board 
members with thorough and timely financial information. In the late 
spring of each school year, a NHA finance officer presents each 
school’s board with a projected budget for the following school 
year.277 That proposed budget is then revised periodically throughout 
the school year to reflect changes in revenues and expenses.278 In 
addition, the finance officer provides quarterly financial reports 
showing year-to-date revenue and expense figures.279 
However, after examining scores of such finance reports that 
stretch over more than a decade, I was struck by two serious 
shortcomings. First, there is virtually no indication that any director 
ever asked any question about the figures presented in the reports. 
Second, over time, the reports themselves became more and more 
 
funds for a karaoke system); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. 
(Oct. 5, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of 
several $500 coaching stipends); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. 
(Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of 
board funds for craft materials); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. 
(Apr. 5, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of 
board funds for athletic equipment, a laminating machine, and conferences); Board 
Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 4, 2001) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board funds for “shelving”); Board 
Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (June 1, 2000) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board funds for flags, flagpoles, and 
conference travel); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Oct. 7, 1999) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board 
discretionary funds on musical instruments). 
 276. It raises an interesting ethical issue, one beyond the scope of this Article, whether 
the attorney can in fact provide disinterested advice to the board of directors, particularly 
when that advice might be adverse to the interests of NHA. After all, NHA pays all of the 
bills for the charter school and, under the management contract, has extremely broad 
discretion to decide whom to pay. Still, in at least a few instances, the attorney appeared to 
provide directors with independent advice. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro 
Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (July 1, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (recording 
an attorney’s advice to the directors to be sure they record any objections or questions in 
the corporate minutes). 
 277. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (June 1, 2000) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting the board with a proposed 
budget for the 2000–2001 fiscal year). 
 278. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 4, 2001) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting the board a revised 2000–2001 
fiscal year budget). 
 279. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Mar. 2, 2000) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting the board with a quarterly 
financial update). 
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confusing and opaque, particularly if one were trying to determine 
exactly how much revenue was going to NHA.280 
For example, in the early years of NHA’s operations in North 
Carolina, its normal financial report consisted of a statement of 
revenues and expenses that included an expense line item identified 
as “Purchased Management Services – National Heritage 
Academies.”281 A reasonable director reading that report would 
assume that line was the total amount that NHA charged for the 
various administrative services it provided. If the director were aware 
that NHA was also the school’s landlord,282 he would rightly assume 
that money was also going to NHA. Most of the other categories in 
the report were self-explanatory, such as salaries and benefits for 
teachers. 
But as time went on, and as total revenues at the NHA-managed 
schools grew to many millions, the financial reports became 
increasingly convoluted as the number of budget line items multiplied 
and their descriptors grew increasingly vague. By July of 2001, the 
budgets included the category “Central Services,”283 which gave rise 
to the subcategories “Data Processing,” “Staff/Personnel Services,” 
and “Other Central Services.”284 There also appeared a category 
named “Business Support Services,” which included “Fiscal Services” 
and “Internal Services.”285 By the mid-2000s, the reports contained so 
many vague line items that an outside observer would have little idea 
what the money was actually being spent on, and a nonprofit director 
examining the same documents would be in the same position unless 
she asked aggressive clarifying questions.286 And yet, there is no 
evidence that directors asked any such questions.287 
 
 280. See Wang II, supra note 255 (arguing it is hard for charter school boards to follow 
the money when nearly all of it goes into the accounts of a private company). 
 281. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Aug. 12, 1999) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (referring to the $197,293 allocated to 
purchased management services). 
 282. See infra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 283. See, e.g., Revised Budget for 2001–2002, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (June 6, 
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (including Central Services in the 
Expenditures column). 
 284. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (May 15, 2002) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 285. See, e.g., id. 
 286. Eventually, NHA’s Director of Accounting began circulating a memorandum with 
each financial report that purported to explain the budget line items. See, e.g., Board 
Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (May 8, 2007) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review) (including an explanatory memo by Kathy Schmidt, Director of 
School Accounting). However, they shed little light on what the money was actually being 
spent on and no light on how the charges were determined. Id. For example, the memo 
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Even if a director were able to discover precise meanings for 
these fuzzy line items, she would have little or no idea how NHA 
arrived at the reported figures. As indicated earlier, all of the 
nonprofit organization’s revenues are swept into NHA’s bank 
account, and the only expense information the board gets back is 
whatever NHA tells it the goods and services cost. A director could 
ask NHA to explain how much the company actually spent for a 
particular good or service, or even how much profit NHA reaped as a 
result of a particular transaction, but NHA would be under no 
obligation, contractual or legal, to reveal that information. As 
mentioned earlier, obtaining a clear picture of where the money is 
going is further hampered by the fact that the management contract 
explicitly permits NHA to attribute the expenses of shared back-
office services to any of its schools, so long as the attribution is 
“reasonable.”288  
In the years’ worth of meeting minutes and budget reports I 
reviewed, a troubling pattern emerged. In the spring, NHA would 
present to the school’s board a projected budget for the following 
school year. Once the school year began, NHA would introduce 
amended budgets, and, more often than not, report an increase in 
total revenues as a result of healthier-than-projected student 
enrollment or the acquisition of grants. Along with the increase in 
revenue, NHA’s amended budgets would show significant increases in 
the dollar figures attached to the fuzzy expense line items. So, for 
example, in the amended budget, the “Internal Services” line item 
might increase by tens of thousands of dollars. In most such cases, it 
was impossible to conjure an explanation of why an increase in total 
revenues would lead to a big increase in spending on “Internal 
Services.”289 
 
explains “State and Federal Relations” as “central services for governmental relations, 
partner services, and intervention services.” Id. The category “Business and Internal 
Services” is explained as being “for finance, payroll, compliance monitoring, facilities 
management, and real estate acquisition.” Id. Query why a school that is forking over a 
huge monthly lease payment to NHA should be billed for “real estate acquisition.” 
“Central Services” is explained as “central services for people services, people 
development, technology, and research and development.” Id.  
 287. See Wang II, supra note 255 (arguing that state auditors in New York examined 
the finances of an NHA-managed school in Buffalo and determined that although the 
school’s board approved overall budgets, it appeared to accept the company’s numbers 
with few questions so that its signoff was “essentially meaningless”). 
 288. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 289. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (May 8, 2007) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting a final revised budget for the 2006–
2007 fiscal year that raised estimated total revenues from $4.8 million to $5.2 million and 
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Perhaps there are legitimate business justifications, but if so, 
nothing on the record indicates that NHA shared these justifications 
with the nonprofit directors. Of course, the vague line items and 
frequently shifting dollar amounts also would be consistent with 
NHA’s desire to create “slush” categories that, in combination with 
its flexibility to attribute shared expenses to whichever schools it 
chooses, would permit it to mask situations where it was amassing 
eye-popping profits.290 
 
distributed the excess through various vague administrative budget categories); Board 
Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 14, 2006) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review) (presenting a revised projected budget for the 2006–2007 fiscal year 
with total revenue increasing from approximately $4.4 million to approximately $4.8 
million and increases in several of the vague administrative categories including “Central 
Support Services” alone increasing from $161,000 to $195,000); Board Meeting Minutes, 
Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 4, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) 
(presenting a revised budget for the 2000–2001 fiscal year in which total revenue increased 
from approximately $2.6 million to approximately $2.9 million and the excess was 
distributed through various vague administrative budget categories); Board Meeting 
Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (May 13, 2014) (on file with the North Carolina 
Law Review) (presenting financial reports indicating that the final amended budget for 
the 2013–2014 fiscal year increased from $5.5 million to $5.7 million and that the excess 
funds were spent on, among other things, “Central Services”); Board Meeting Minutes, 
Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Apr. 5, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review) (including a year-end budget report for the 2004–2005 fiscal year, showing that 
the original projected budget was approximately $4.3 million; by year-end, actual revenues 
were approximately $4.5 million. The excess was sprinkled through “Executive 
Administration,” “Business Administration,” and “Central Administration,” and “Central 
Administration” alone increased, for no obvious reason, by $36,000); Board Meeting 
Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Dec. 7, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina 
Law Review) (revealing year-end spending figures substantially above the projected 
amounts and where the extra funds were distributed into budget categories such as 
“Executive Administration” and “Central Services”); Board Meeting Minutes, 
PreEminent Charter Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 14, 2011) (on file with the North Carolina 
Law Review) (presenting the board with an amended budget that increased projected 
revenue by approximately $155,000 and distributed the excess through various vague 
administrative categories); Board Meeting Minutes, Queens Grant Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Dirs. 
(May 15, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting a final revised 
budget for the 2007–2008 fiscal year revealing that projected revenue increased from 
approximately $5.3 million to approximately $5.7 million and that several vague 
administrative categories increased markedly, including an increase of more than $50,000 
for “Central Services”). 
 290. In recent years, NHA has begun “invoicing” its schools for the services it 
provides. I can only assume they have taken to this practice in hopes of cementing the 
perception that the school is paying for concrete and valuable services that NHA is 
providing. However, as far as I can tell, those invoices serve no useful purpose. They 
simply parrot the line items, including the same apparent slush categories, contained in the 
financial reports. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. Of Dirs. (Sept. 
10, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (including three invoices from the 
NHA). 
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To take one illustrative example, board minutes from the 
November 5, 2002, meeting at Greensboro Academy reveal that 
NHA presented a revised budget for the 2002–2003 school year that 
increased projections of total revenue by approximately $142,000 as a 
result of greater than expected enrollment.291 The remainder of the 
budget projection sprinkles most of that windfall through various 
vague line items so that “Executive Administration” increased by 
$63,000, “Business Support Services” increased by $19,000, and the 
illusive “Central Services” increased by $34,000, all without any 
explanation of why those expense categories would increase 
significantly as a result of the addition of a relative handful of 
students.292 
One budget item that would be difficult for NHA to obscure is 
lease payments to NHA in exchange for providing school facilities. 
From the perspective of NHA, the lease arrangements constitute 
what my friends from the entrepreneurial business sector would refer 
to as a brilliant “real estate play” because there is virtually no way for 
NHA to lose. Technically, NHA leases the facilities from its own 
property development affiliate, Charter Development Company, 
LLC, and then subleases the property to the charter school.293 The 
terms of the lease make clear that if the school loses its charter294 or 
for any reason terminates the management agreement, NHA takes 
back the real estate along with everything attached to it.295 According 
to other lease terms, the tenant—meaning the charter school 
nonprofit—pays all maintenance,296 repair,297 utilities,298 taxes,299 and 
insurance.300 The terms that require the tenant to pay expenses are, of 
 
 291. Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 5, 2002) (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 292. See id.; see also Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Sept. 10, 
2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reflecting a similar increase in 
projected total revenues and corresponding increases in expenses attributed to vague line 
items); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Apr. 5, 2005) (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review) (similar); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro 
Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Dec. 7, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (similar). 
 293. See, e.g., Greensboro Acad. Lease Agreement, supra note 262, at Recitals para. A 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (indicating that Charter Development 
Company, LLC is the property’s owner and that it has entered into a Master Lease with 
NHA). 
 294. See id. at para. 13.1.E. 
 295. Id. at para. 13.2. 
 296. Id. at para. 9.1. 
 297. Id. at para. 8.1. 
 298. Id. at para. 5.1. 
 299. Id. at para. 6.1. 
 300. Id. at para. 7.1. 
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course, conceptually confusing since in fact NHA takes all of the 
nonprofit’s revenue before the school ever gets its hands on it, and 
pays itself301—in effect taking money out of one of its pockets and 
shifting it to another—for rent, maintenance, and all other 
expenses.302 Under another provision of the lease, the nonprofit also 
agrees that if NHA makes capital improvements to the property, it 
may raise the rent to compensate itself.303 Thus, under the terms of 
the lease between NHA and its charter schools, there is virtually no 
way for NHA to lose money. It takes the nonprofit organization’s 
money, pays itself whatever it wants in rent (thereby eliminating any 
debt it incurred in constructing the facility), and reimburses itself for 
any and all real-estate-related expenses. 
Not surprisingly, available evidence points toward significant 
real-estate-related profits. In some instances, the schools pay rents 
approaching $1 million per year.304 When maintenance and other 
expenses are added on, the charges can be upwards of $1.2 million per 
year.305 Tax records for PreEminent Charter Academy, a NHA-
managed school in North Carolina, furnish evidence of generous 
profits reaped by NHA. Those records indicate that the land for the 
school was purchased from the previous owners in 2002 for 
$180,000.306 A construction permit was issued for the same parcel in 
June 2002 for a building valued at $2.9 million, which apparently was 
completed in April 2003.307 In 2003, PreEminent Charter School 
 
 301. Another provision of the lease is fascinatingly convoluted. Paragraph 2.1 states 
that “[p]ursuant to the terms of the Management Agreement between [NHA] and 
Tenant[], NHA is providing the leased facilities and Tenant has assigned all costs to be 
paid by Tenant under the terms of this Lease to NHA, which assignment shall remain in 
effect . . . . ” Id. at para. 2.1. If my law students turned in such a provision, I would tell 
them to rewrite it in comprehensible language. What it appears to mean is that the parties 
acknowledge that the Management Agreement between the charter school and NHA 
provides NHA with the right to use the nonprofit’s money to pay itself for providing the 
real estate. 
 302. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text (explaining “sweeps” contracts). 
 303. Greensboro Acad. Lease Agreement, supra note 262, at para. 3.5.  
 304. See, e.g., Ninth Amendment to Lease Agreement Between National Heritage 
Academy, Inc. and Greensboro Academy, Inc. (May 22, 2008) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review) (establishing annual rent for the school facility at $977,760). 
 305. See, e.g., Greensboro Academy, Proposed Initial Budget for the 2008–2009 School 
Year, (Apr. 14, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (showing a projected 
annual expense of $1.34 million for Operations and Maintenance). 
 306. Account Summary for 3815 Rock Quarry Road, WAKE COUNTY REAL EST. DATA, 
http://services.wakegov.com/realestate/Account.asp?id=0067665&stype=owner&owner
=BTYPE-Charter+Development+Company&spg=1 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 
 307. Assessment Notes for 3815 Rock Quarry Road, WAKE COUNTY REAL EST. DATA, 
http://services.wakegov.com/realestate/Notes.asp?id=0067665&cd=01&loc=3815++ROCK
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began paying annual rent for that facility at the level of $813,120.308 
For several years thereafter, annual rent settled at approximately 
$772,000,309 but, effective in 2013, rose to $814,560.310 All this time, of 
course, NHA was exercising its right under the lease and management 
agreements to pay itself for providing all maintenance and repair.311 
Given the apparently modest cost of acquisition and construction and 
the large, ongoing rent payments from PreEminent to NHA, which 
appear to have totaled more than $6 million over a period of eight 
years, one could reasonably speculate that NHA’s real estate 
development costs were long ago paid off, that the stream of 
payments now constitutes healthy profit, and that there is no end in 
sight for the good times that NHA is enjoying. 
This was the conclusion of a Detroit Free Press investigative 
series that focused on NHA’s business practices.312 According to the 
report, NHA typically fronts the money to build or renovate charter 
schools and rapidly recoups its investment through rents charged to 
the schools.313 Those rents, invariably paid with a secure stream of 
public dollars, generally do not decrease even after NHA has 
recovered its initial investment.314 To compound the problem, there is 
evidence that the monthly and yearly rents NHA charges are, at least 
in some instances, above market rate.315 
 
+QUARRY+RD&des=PROP+OF+CHARTER+DEVELOPMENT+CO+LLC+BM2002
-01374&pin=1722460857 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 
 308. First Amendment to Lease Agreement Between National Heritage Academy, Inc. 
and PreEminent Charter School (May 12, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). 
 309. Fourth Amendment to Lease Agreement Between National Heritage Academy 
and PreEminent Charter School (May 22, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review) (establishing annual rent at $772,640). 
 310. Tenth Amendment to Lease Agreement Between National Heritage Academy 
and PreEminent Charter School (effective July 1, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina 
Law Review). 
 311. See supra notes 296–304 and accompanying text. 
 312. Dixon, supra note 253. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Martha Thierry, Graphic: National Heritage Academy’s Rents Exceed What Most 
Experts Say are Reasonable, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 21, 2014), http://archive.freep.com
/interactive/article/20140622/NEWS06/140621006/Graphic-National-Heritage-Academy-s-
rents-exceed-what-most-experts-say-reasonable; see also Wang II, supra note 255 (arguing 
that New York state auditors concluded that Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School, run by 
NHA, was paying above-market rent for its building). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015) 
1812 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
2.  Description of Financial and Management Practices of Schools 
Managed by Charter Schools USA 
In some respects, CSUSA’s management practices are similar to 
those of NHA. Based on my review of their meeting minutes, boards 
of directors meet regularly, receive updates on school performance 
and parent satisfaction, and approve policies and procedures drafted 
or amended by CSUSA staff. The boards have at least some 
involvement in hiring decisions, though they do not receive detailed 
information about job applicants, and their approvals often appear 
perfunctory. To a greater extent than the NHA or RBA schools, the 
boards at CSUSA-managed schools appear to benefit from 
independent legal advice.316 As with NHA, the schools’ directors 
receive periodic financial reports that could only be fully understood 
if board members were asking detailed questions. As with NHA, 
there is little evidence that directors ever pose such questions. 
However, CSUSA’s standard management contract is different 
from NHA’s in several respects and in general is less controlling. To 
begin, it is not a sweeps contract,317 although CSUSA does have 
unfettered access to the nonprofit schools’ checking accounts.318 
CSUSA takes a flat management fee defined as fifteen percent of 
total revenues.319 Also unlike NHA, the contract provides that at least 
some equipment and materials purchased for the school become the 
school’s property, meaning the school would be left with some 
education-related equipment if the management contract were 
terminated.320 The contract’s default and termination provisions are 
more stringent than those of NHA.321 Instead of granting either party 
the right to terminate the management contract upon ninety-days’ 
notice (a right that, as explained above, is largely illusory because of 
the “Grinch” problem),322 CSUSA’s contract carefully defines default, 
 
 316. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Cabarrus Charter Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 22, 
2014) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (indicating the school’s lawyer 
recommended changes to the real estate development contract between the school and 
CSUSA’s real estate affiliate, Red Apple Development). 
 317. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. 
 318. Charter Management Agreement Between Charter School USA and the North 
Carolina Charter Education Foundation, Inc. art. V, para. A (Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter 
Charter Mgmt. Agreement Between Charter Sch. USA and the N.C. Charter Educ. 
Found., Inc.] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 319. Id. at art. V, para. E. 
 320. Id. at art. III, para. D. 
 321. See id. at art. VII. 
 322. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
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requires an opportunity to cure, and permits termination only if those 
terms are not met.323 
When applying for new North Carolina charters, CSUSA has 
addressed state regulators’ concerns about the control it wields over 
schools by repeating the mantra that their relationship is subject to a 
“performance based contract.”324 By this they mean that the 
management contract requires them to perform a broad array of 
services, and that the contract’s default provisions permit the schools 
to terminate the contracts if those obligations are not met. For two 
reasons, this answer is dissatisfying. First, it is true of most contracts 
that performance is due from both parties and that one may terminate 
if the other fails to perform. There is nothing special or different 
about these CSUSA management contracts. Second, the contract’s 
definition of nonperformance is narrow and does not include 
language that would permit the schools to simply decide that they 
were not getting a good enough deal and wanted to look elsewhere 
for their management functions.325 
From a nonprofit law perspective, the most troubling aspect of 
CSUSA’s relationship with its schools involves real estate. CSUSA’s 
real estate development affiliate, Red Apple Development, owns the 
North Carolina charter schools’ facilities, and there is at least some 
evidence to indicate that CSUSA attempted to conceal from state and 
federal authorities the fact that the schools’ EMO would also, in 
effect, be their landlord. For example, when the nonprofit 
corporation responsible for Cabarrus Charter Academy filed its IRS 
Form 1023 seeking 501(c)(3) status, it responded to a question about 
real estate development by saying “[i]t is anticipated that a school 
[facility] will be constructed and financed by a private developer on 
the site, who will in turn lease the facility to the Academy.”326 In 
response to another specific question about how Cabarrus would 
ensure that its facility would be developed under a market-rate, arms-
 
 323. Charter Mgmt. Agreement Between Charter Sch. USA and the N.C. Charter 
Educ. Found., Inc., supra note 318, at art. VII. 
 324. Charter School Application for 2013: Cabarrus Charter Academy, N.C. Charter 
Educ. Found., Inc. 41 (Apr. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Cabarrus Charter Application], 
available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/resources/application
/2014apps/cabarruscharter.pdf. 
 325. Charter Mgmt. Agreement Between Charter Sch. USA and the N.C. Charter 
Educ. Found., Inc., supra note 318, at art. VII. 
 326. The N.C. Charter Found., Inc., IRS Form 1023, Application for Recognition of 
Exemption pt. IV (OMB No. 1545-0056) (2013). 
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length transaction, the school simply did not answer, though the 
Form’s instructions clearly required it to do so.327 
Similarly, in Cabarrus Charter Academy’s charter application to 
the North Carolina Office of Charter Schools, it responded to a 
question about school facilities by claiming that a “private developer” 
would construct the buildings and that the name of the landlord was 
unknown.328 Worse yet, the North Carolina charter application filed 
by Cardinal Charter Academy explicitly claimed that the facility 
would not be owned by the management company and that it would 
be constructed and financed by a “third party” who would rent it to 
the school.329 It further asserted that the lease agreement would be 
“independent of the Board’s management agreement.”330 These 
responses are at best disingenuous, since the questions clearly are 
intended to ferret out whether the management company is also 
going to be the landlord, and that all of CSUSA’s charter-related real 
estate transactions followed an established pattern that result in its 
affiliate, Red Apple, leasing the properties to the schools,331 and 
reaping what appears to be very healthy returns.332 It may also be 
 
 327. See id. at pt. VIII, Question 7a & Sched. B, § 1, Question 7 (asking “will persons 
other than your employees or volunteers develop your facilities” and requiring a detailed 
explanation if the answer is yes). 
 328. Cabarrus Charter Application, supra note 324, at 149. 
 329. NC Charter School Application for School Opening 2014: Cardinal Charter 
Academy, N.C. Charter Educ. Found., Inc. 28 (Mar. 1, 2013) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review). 
 330. Id. 
 331. The pattern is that the schools’ initial real estate development is undertaken by 
Ryan Companies, US, which is a large international construction firm. See generally RYAN 
COMPANIES, http://www.ryancompanies.com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). Ryan enters into 
a twenty-year commercial “triple net lease” (meaning, in essence, the tenant pays all 
expenses) with the charter-holding nonprofit. See Lease Agreement by and Between Ryan 
Co. US, Inc. and North Carolina Charter Education Foundation, Inc. art. II, para. 3–4; art. 
III para. 2; art. V; art. VI, para. 1 (Nov. 23, 2012) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). Soon thereafter, Ryan conveys the property to Red Apple Development, which 
steps into Ryan’s shoes and assumes the lease. Our Schools, RED APPLE DEV., 
http://www.redappledevelopment.com/our-schools/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). There 
could be perfectly valid business justifications for structuring the transaction in this way, 
but, from the perspective of CSUSA, it also has the advantageous result of making its 
assertions about a “third party” developing and renting school facilities to the charter 
schools at least technically true. It also means that neither Red Apple’s nor CSUSA’s 
name is associated with the schools’ real estate development during the crucial period 
when they are being closely examined by state and federal regulators. 
 332. See Cabarrus Charter Application, supra note 324, at 138 (projecting that 
Cabarrus would be paying $1.9 million in rent/lease expenses by year five of its existence); 
see also Lease Agreement by and Between Ryan Co. US, Inc. and North Carolina Charter 
Education Foundation, Inc., supra note 331, at art. II (showing a schedule of rent 
payments that begins modestly at $80,000 per year, but ends in year twenty with annual 
payments of $1.8 million).  
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worth pointing out that none of the documents that CSUSA provided 
to me revealed the role played by Red Apple. The only reason I 
discovered Red Apple’s involvement is that I checked the real estate 
records in the relevant counties. 
Given this information about CSUSA’s involvement with charter 
school real estate, it should not be surprising that others have focused 
on the same issue and have found what they consider to be improper 
behavior. One recent investigative report in Florida, where CSUSA is 
headquartered and runs numerous charter schools, alleged that 
CSUSA earns tens of millions of dollars a year by acting as, 
essentially, a real estate firm.333 An investigation by the Florida 
League of Women Voters came to a similar conclusion.334 
To summarize, NHA, by means of the management contracts it 
enters into with North Carolina nonprofit charter-holding 
corporations, sweeps millions of public dollars into its own coffers 
every year and reveals little about precisely how that money is spent 
and how much of it goes to corporate profits rather than the provision 
of public education. Under the terms of their lease arrangements with 
charter schools, both NHA and CSUSA (as well as RBA) engage in 
what appear to be highly lucrative real estate deals that permit them 
to obtain ownership of valuable properties using public funds and 
charge charter-holding nonprofits rent (possibly above-market rent) 
long after their acquisition-related debts are paid off. Because the 
management organizations own the schools’ real estate (and, in the 
case of RBA and NHA, practically everything else the schools need 
to function), the schools’ boards of directors are virtually powerless to 
fire them or otherwise alter the relationships. 
3.  The Application of Nonprofit Legal Doctrines to Schools Managed 
by National Heritage Academies and Charter Schools USA 
Although the foregoing discussion may make some readers 
queasy—particularly if they pay taxes in North Carolina—NHA and 
CSUSA doubtless would respond that nothing in the state’s charter 
school legislation explicitly prohibits such management and financial 
practices. They would be correct, but they would also be ignoring the 
 
 333. Jeff Bryant, Charter Schools Don’t Need an Ad Campaign; They Need Regulation, 
CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://ourfuture.org/20140828
/charter-schools-dont-need-an-ad-campaign-they-need-regulation; see also Noah Pransky, 
Charter Schools Making Big Profits for Private Companies, WTSP (Tampa, Fla. Aug. 2, 
2014), http://www.wtsp.com/story/news/investigations/2014/08/21/charter-school-profits-
on-real-estate/14420317/ (describing the business model of CSUSA). 
 334. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLA., supra note 9, at 7–12. 
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application of state and federal nonprofit law to charter schools and 
their management. This discussion begins by specifying which of the 
nonprofit legal doctrines discussed in Part I do not apply to NHA’s 
and CSUSA’s management practices. 
Private inurement does not apply because that doctrine forbids 
nonprofit corporate insiders from lining their pockets with charitable 
assets.335 Among the schools managed by NHA and CSUSA, there 
may be diversion of charitable assets taking place, but there is no 
evidence that corporate insiders, such as nonprofit board members, 
are skimming money themselves or colluding with others to do so. 
Similarly, because neither NHA nor CSUSA is a DQP336 with respect 
to the charter-holding nonprofits, they will not be subject to 
intermediate sanctions penalties.337 Finally, the state law fiduciary 
duty of loyalty covers much the same ground as private inurement 
and intermediate sanctions, and for similar reasons, is inapplicable 
here. That, however, still leaves the private benefit doctrine (along 
with its close cousin the operational test) and the state law fiduciary 
duties of obedience and care. 
a. Operational Test and Private Benefit Doctrine 
NHA- and CSUSA-managed schools should be concerned about 
failing the IRS’s operational test and thereby losing their 501(c)(3) 
tax-exempt status. The test asks whether more than an insubstantial 
part of a given charity’s activities are in furtherance of something 
other than its charitable purpose.338 Because the operational test, like 
many IRS doctrines, is guided by a vague “all the factors” analysis,339 
it is difficult to determine in advance whether the NHA- and CSUSA-
managed schools have crossed the line into noncompliance, but there 
is sufficient evidence available to assume that both are in peril. Given 
that NHA manages its schools under a sweeps contract and thereby 
 
 335. See supra Section II.B.1.a. 
 336. See supra Section II.B.1.a. 
 337. As discussed in Section III.A.2.a, RBA and its for-profit affiliate companies can 
be considered DQPs in relation to its charter-holding nonprofit due to Mitchell’s 
involvement with the nonprofit’s board of directors. In contrast, no individuals on NHA’s 
or CSUSA’s boards are owners of the for-profit companies that manage them. Once again, 
however, I would invite others to make the argument that the for-profit management 
companies, especially NHA, should qualify as insiders by virtue of their comprehensive 
contractual control over the schools they manage. Such an argument, while intriguing, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 338. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 339. See HOPKINS, supra note 74, at 79 (arguing that the operational test question of 
whether an organization has a substantial nonexempt purpose is a question of fact based 
on all the available evidence). 
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controls virtually every aspect of their operations and finances, given 
that its financial reports are opaque and that it is virtually impossible 
to determine how much of the public’s money is being diverted into 
corporate profits, and given that there is little evidence that the 
schools’ boards of directors have bothered to investigate that 
question, there are grounds to believe that a substantial portion of the 
nonprofit schools’ activities and resources are being devoted to 
noncharitable purposes—namely generating profits for NHA. The 
case is weaker for CSUSA-managed schools, both because their 
boards appear to be more engaged and because the evidence of 
troubling profiteering is confined to the realm of real estate.340 
This group of charter schools and their for-profit management 
companies should also be concerned about the application of the 
IRS’s private benefit doctrine, which, similar to the operational test, 
asks whether a charitable organization’s benefits are more than 
incidentally flowing to private individuals outside the charitable 
class.341 There is ample evidence indicating that the financial benefits 
flowing to CSUSA, and especially to NHA, are quantitatively 
substantial.342 NHA, through its management contracts and leases, 
maintains almost complete control over its schools’ operations and 
finances. The “Grinch” clauses343 render it virtually certain that the 
boards will not challenge NHA’s control no matter what percentage 
of the charitable dollars it takes for itself. Although no one will know 
how extensive NHA’s profits are until and unless legal authorities 
compel them to disclose that information, the schools’ budgets 
indicate that NHA’s management fee combined with its real estate 
profits amounts to millions of dollars annually.344 In the case of 
CSUSA, there is at least some evidence to indicate that it is receiving 
substantial economic benefits as a result of the real estate its affiliate 
leases to the schools it manages.345 As discussed in Section II.B.2.b, 
above, demonstrating a private benefit violation does not require 
proof that benefits are flowing to outsiders at above-market rates, 
only that they are substantial and that they are ending up with 
individuals who are not part of the charitable class.346 
 
 340. See supra notes 317–31 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra Section II.B.2.b. 
 342. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing quantitative and qualitative 
substantial benefit). 
 343. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 290–312 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra notes 326–34 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra Section II.B.2.b. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015) 
1818 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
Likewise, there is evidence to prove that the benefits flowing to 
CSUSA, and especially to NHA, are qualitatively substantial. As in 
the credit-counseling cases discussed in Section II.B.2.b, the nonprofit 
charter-holding organizations have off-loaded substantial portions of 
their operations to for-profit providers when there is no reason to 
believe that the schools could not provide those services themselves 
in a more efficient and cost-effective manner.347 In the case of NHA, 
with its sweeps contracts, one could argue that the boards handed the 
schools’ keys over to the for-profit company. The fact that there are 
successful independently managed charter schools all across the state 
belies any contention that these charter schools would not be able to 
fulfill their charitable missions without resorting to the for-profit 
organizations’ services, and that alone is sufficient to demonstrate 
that the benefits are qualitatively substantial.348 
b. Fiduciary Duties of Obedience and Care 
In addition to potentially engaging in violations of federal 
nonprofit law, the NHA- and CSUSA-managed charters are in peril 
of violating state fiduciary duties applicable in the nonprofit sphere. 
Although it is unlikely that the North Carolina Office of the Attorney 
General will intervene to enforce the fiduciary duties of the boards of 
directors of the nonprofit charter-holding schools,349 there are 
 
 347. See supra Section II.B.2.b. 
 348. In the case of NHA, it is clear that the IRS had similar private-benefit concerns to 
those expressed here. After at least two of its schools, Greensboro Academy and 
PreEminent Charter Academy, had already begun operations, the IRS rejected their 
initial 501(c)(3) applications, largely on private-benefit grounds. Based on the evidence, 
the IRS feared that NHA would retain complete control over the schools and use that 
control to funnel large profits to itself. The schools hired a high-priced Washington, D.C. 
law firm, which produced point-by-point, extensive written rebuttals of the IRS’s legal 
arguments. In addition to the exhaustive (and exhausting) legal arguments, NHA offered 
to amend certain aspects of its management contract, including a clause that permitted 
NHA to terminate the contract (and leave the schools with nothing) if the schools’ boards 
interfered with NHA hiring decisions. As often happens when the IRS is confronted with 
the prospect of pitched legal battle, it folded and granted 501(c)(3) status to the schools. 
Compare Letter from Gerald V. Sack, IRS Manager of Exempt Org. Technical Grp. 4, to 
Greensboro Acad. (Apr. 18, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) 
(rejecting Greensboro Academy’s 501(c)(3) application largely on private benefit 
grounds), with Letter from Celia Roady, Attorney Representing Greensboro Acad., to the 
IRS (July 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (appealing the rejection 
and offering to amend certain terms of the management contract), and Letter from Gerald 
V Sack, IRS Manager of Exempt Org. Technical Grp. 4, to Greensboro Acad. (Aug. 7, 
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reversing the IRS’s earlier denial and 
granting 501(c)(3) status). This Article suggests that, more than a decade later, the IRS 
should take another close look. 
 349. See supra Section II.A.4 (discussing the North Carolina Attorney General’s lack 
of enforcement resources). 
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grounds to believe that directors at NHA and CSUSA are not 
fulfilling them. 
The duty of obedience requires directors to ensure that a 
charitable organization’s resources are being used to serve its 
charitable purposes.350 Among other things, directors should engage 
in reasonable comparative shopping to ensure that the organization’s 
money is being spent with reasonable efficiency.351 If close 
examination reveals that board members are permitting significant 
charitable assets—assets that might otherwise be used to improve or 
expand charitable and educational services—to be diverted to 
unreasonable corporate profits, the directors could be violating their 
duty of obedience. For the schools described in this second category, 
there is no evidence that directors are engaging in any sort of 
comparative shopping, and there is at least some evidence that 
financial resources are being unreasonably diverted from serving the 
schools’ charitable and educational missions. 
Likewise, the schools’ governance practices should be carefully 
examined to determine if directors are adhering to their duty of care. 
Directors at schools managed by NHA and CSUSA receive 
reasonably detailed information about policies and procedures, 
student achievement, parent satisfaction, personnel matters, and 
other operational matters. They also receive periodic financial reports 
that provide them up-to-date information about the schools’ gross 
revenues and spending. However, particularly in the case of NHA-
managed schools, directors have no way of determining how NHA 
formulates the expense figures that it reports and whether they are 
accurate and reasonable. Nor do the directors have any way of 
knowing what percentage of the schools’ resources is being taken as 
profit by NHA. The duty of care would require them to at least ask.352 
C. Third Category: Charter Schools that Appear to Comply with 
Nonprofit Law 
Because rectitude is less interesting than controversy, this 
discussion will be brief. In general, governance practices at the 
independently managed charter schools in my sample,353 as well as the 
schools managed by KIPP, a nonprofit management company, were 
thorough, correct, and in compliance with nonprofit law. Their boards 
 
 350. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 351. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 352. See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the fiduciary duty of care). 
 353. These schools are: Socrates Academy, Tiller School, and Woods Charter School. 
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met regularly and kept reasonably detailed minutes.354 They tended to 
have more directors than the boards of EMO-managed schools,355 and 
they enhanced the governance capabilities of the directors by creating 
numerous board committees.356 Some organize themselves as 
membership nonprofit corporations, which usually means that 
students’ parents vote each year to decide who serves on the board of 
directors.357 Many of the organizations were models of transparency, 
posting their board meeting minutes358 and other significant corporate 
documents on their websites.359 A review of the minutes showed that 
directors were privy to detailed financial information about the 
organizations,360 regularly assessed multiple bids for vendors’ 
 
 354. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Sept. 11, 2013) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing governance details and breaking 
financial reports down into granular categories). 
 355. Compare Board of Directors, SOCRATES ACAD., http://www.socratesacademy.us
/~socrates/index.php/about-socrates/board-of-directors (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (listing 
eight board members), and Tiller School Board of Directors, TILLER SCH., http://
tillerschool.org/board-of-directors/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (listing twelve board 
members), with Our School Board, GREENSBORO ACAD., https://www.nhaschools.com
/schools/greensboro/en/About-Us/Pages/Our-School-Board.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 
2015) (listing five board members). 
 356. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, KIPP Gaston Coll. Preparatory Bd. of Dirs. 
(Sept. 18, 2013) (referring to reports by the Finance and Governance committees); Board 
of Directors Committees, SOCRATES ACAD., http://www.socratesacademy.us/~socrates
/index.php/about-socrates/board-of-directors/board-committees (last visited Aug. 17, 
2015) (listing sixteen separate board committees). 
 357. See, e.g., BYLAWS OF THE TILLER SCHOOL OF CARTERET COUNTY, available at 
http://tillerschool.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tiller_School_Bylaws-Revised-
December-2013.pdf (last revised Dec. 2013) (describing the school’s membership 
structure). 
 358. See, e.g., School Board, WOODS CHARTER SCH., http://www.woodscharter.org
/school-board (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (posting board meeting minutes, bylaws, and 
other corporate documents). 
 359. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 13, 2013) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review); Tiller Community Portal, TILLER SCH., 
http://tillerschool.org/community-portal/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2015) (posting corporate 
bylaws and other key documents on their website). 
 360. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (June 11, 2014), 
available at https://www.socratesacademy.us/images/pdf_files/meeting_minutes/June_14
_BOD_Binder-for_web.pdf (reporting budget figures that detail salaries of each 
employee). 
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services,361 and properly identified and scrutinized potential conflicts 
of interest.362 
In short, a nonprofit law assessment of the governance practices 
of schools falling into this third category leaves little to object to. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article raises serious questions about whether certain North 
Carolina charter schools, which by statute must be nonprofit 
organizations, are complying with state and federal nonprofit law. 
The most troubling indications of noncompliance arise among schools 
that are managed under contract by for-profit companies, also 
referred to as EMOs. 
Evidence points to nonprofit law violations among the cluster of 
schools managed by Roger Bacon Academy (“RBA”). Federal 
charity regulators should investigate in particular whether these 
RBA-managed charter schools are violating the private inurement 
and intermediate sanctions doctrines. State charity regulators should 
determine whether two former directors (one of whom still serves as 
the board’s secretary) who are affiliated with RBA violated their 
fiduciary duties of loyalty toward the schools by engaging in self-
dealing transactions. State authorities should also ask whether the 
disinterested directors violated their duty of care by permitting what 
arguably were conflict-of-interest transactions. 
Charity regulators should also closely scrutinize the nonprofit 
law compliance of two additional clusters of North Carolina EMO-
managed charter schools—one managed by National Heritage 
Academies (“NHA”) and the other by Charter Schools USA 
(“CSUSA”). Based on an assessment of years’ worth of board 
meeting minutes and financial reports of NHA-managed schools, it is 
arguable that NHA has perfected the art of appearing to furnish 
nonprofit schools’ board members with detailed information about 
governance and finances while in fact masking how the charitable 
dollars are being spent and how much money NHA is taking as profit. 
My analysis shows little if any evidence that board members at the 
 
 361. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Feb. 12, 2014) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing bids for work on the school’s HVAC 
system); Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Oct. 9, 2013) (on file with 
the North Carolina Law Review) (comparing the costs and benefits of various purchasing 
cards). 
 362. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, KIPP Gaston Coll. Preparatory Bd. of Dirs. 
(Aug. 21, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing one board 
member’s possible conflict of interest). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015) 
1822 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
nonprofit charter schools have taken the necessary steps to 
investigate whether the charitable dollars flowing through their 
schools are being spent with reasonable efficiency. The fact that NHA 
and its corporate affiliate own practically everything the schools need 
to function, including their school facilities, renders it doubtful that 
the nonprofit board members could terminate their management 
agreements even if they did peek into NHA’s financial black box, 
discover that they were getting a bad deal, and decide to make 
changes. Concerning CSUSA, the worst that can be said is that it 
collaborates with its affiliate, Red Apple Development, to make its 
charter schools the subjects of lucrative “real estate plays.” 
Combined, these facts point toward NHA- and CSUSA-managed 
schools’ possible violations of the federal operational test and private 
benefit doctrines and the North Carolina fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care. 
To these potential nonprofit law violations, it is an insufficient 
answer that the charter school students do well on standardized tests 
and that parents generally are satisfied with the schools’ performance. 
In all transactions between charitable organizations and for-profit 
companies, the tax-paying public is a silent third party.363 The 
citizenry subsidizes contributions to charitable organizations in the 
form of charitable tax deductions. In the case of charter school funds, 
the connection to the tax-paying public is even more immediate, since 
the schools’ revenues are comprised almost entirely of tax revenues. 
Tax-paying citizens rely on charity regulators—particularly the IRS 
and the state attorneys general—to look out for their interests in the 
charitable sector and to be sure that their money—the public’s 
money—is not being diverted from charitable purposes into 
nonincidental private profits.364 Given the evidence that has come to 
 
 363. See Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and Those Who 
Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141, 147–48 
(1995) (arguing charities’ duties are to the public and attorneys general and the IRS are 
responsible for protecting the public’s interests); Alice M. Maples, State Attorney General 
Oversight of Nonprofit Healthcare Corporations: Have We Reached an Ideological 
Impasse?, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 235, 237 (2007) (arguing that one of state attorneys generals’ 
most important roles is guarding the public’s interests in charitable assets). 
 364. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 226 (arguing that state attorneys 
general represent the interests of the public by promoting accountability by charitable 
organizations); N.C. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS, supra note 79, at 32 (arguing that 
North Carolina nonprofit law empowers the Attorney General of North Carolina to 
enforce compliance with nonprofit norms); James J. Fishman, The Development of 
Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 639 (1985) 
(arguing that, because most attorneys general devote meager resources to the task of 
protecting the public’s interest in charitable organizations, the IRS has become the de 
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light as a result of this and other inquiries, it is arguable that neither 
the IRS nor the North Carolina Attorney General is fulfilling this 
vitally important monitoring and enforcement function. 
This Article has illuminated questions and potential problems 
with the nonprofit legal compliance of certain North Carolina charter 
schools and called upon charity regulators to investigate whether the 
law is indeed being broken. The question remains whether, in 
addition to investigating these specific incidents, lawmakers should 
consider regulatory changes to ensure that such problems do not arise 
in the future. The matter of regulating for-profit corporations’ 
involvement in charter schools will become all the more urgent when, 
in the near future, for-profit managed virtual charter schools make 
their debut in North Carolina.365 
A thorough exploration of necessary charter school legal and 
regulatory reforms is beyond the scope of this Article, but it 
concludes by offering a few modest suggestions. The North Carolina 
charter statute should be amended to: 
(1) bar individuals associated with EMOs from serving as 
directors or officers of any charter school their EMOs 
manage; 
(2) prohibit sweeps contracts; 
(3) require each EMO to report regularly and in detail 
how much money each school has paid to it and its 
affiliates; 
(4) require all charter schools to post on their websites 
board minutes, board packets (including financial 
reports), important corporate documents (articles of 
incorporation, bylaws, and conflict-of-interest policies), 
Forms 1023, and recent Forms 990; 
(5) prohibit or restrict agreements between charter schools 
and their EMOs’ affiliates for the provision of real and 
 
facto watchdog); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the 
Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480–81 
(2010) (arguing that in recent years the IRS has assumed additional responsibility for 
protecting the public’s interests in charities). 
 365. See Lynn Bonner, Two Virtual Charter Schools on Track for North Carolina, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/12/17
/4411642/two-virtual-charter-schools-on.html (reporting the approval of two virtual 
charter schools, one to be managed by K12, a for-profit company whose management 
practices have been controversial in other states); see also ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. 
REFORM, supra note 16, at 11 (claiming that the academic track record of the online 
charter school industry is “abysmal” and that there are widespread accounts of 
profiteering and fraud). 
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personal property to avoid the “Grinch” problem 
whereby schools are stripped bare if they decide they 
are dissatisfied with the EMO’s performance; and 
(6) require charter school boards to have no fewer than 
nine members (to avoid situations where three 
members of a five-person board are required to review 
and approve massive amounts of material at a given 
board meeting). 
While state regulators are working out the details of those 
reforms, the IRS can focus on clarifying the private benefit doctrine 
as it applies to charter schools. Based on what I have seen in my 
North Carolina sample, the IRS should begin by drawing a bright line 
and declaring that the combination of powers wielded by EMOs such 
as National Heritage Academies—sweeps contracts combined with 
ownership of practically all real and personal property used by the 
schools—are flatly prohibited. 
